The colour revolution failed to gain support from the Serbian Orthodox Church, major corporate employees, or the working class. Instead, it drew primarily from the upper and middle classes – the most educated demographic, yet one excluded from meaningful dialogue on national issues. Moving forward, Vučić’s party must engage this segment to avoid becoming an isolated ruling caste, Aleksandar Raković writes.
The Republic of Serbia has been facing a colour revolution for months, the origin of which remains uncertain, as does its leadership. However, historical precedent suggests this is the work of Western deep states. There is also a prevailing belief that the colour revolution was triggered as retribution for Serbia’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia. The organizers – whether hidden behind the scenes or operating through artificial intelligence – are exploiting the multifaceted discontent of Serbian citizens. The ultimate goal of this carefully orchestrated colour revolution is the overthrow of President Aleksandar Vučić.
To fully grasp the situation in Serbia, it is necessary to dissect the layers of dissatisfaction and examine how entirely disparate groups have united in their aim to topple the legally elected government.
In recent years, pro-Western opposition parties have attempted to rally the public against the government. The first major mobilization occurred in the autumn of 2021, when the government’s plan to permit Rio Tinto to mine lithium in western Serbia sparked protests. However, these so-called “environmental protests” failed to sustain momentum, fading within months. Yet, it became evident that a segment of the population was willing to demonstrate against the government on any issue – blocking roads, even major highways through Belgrade, and disrupting daily life.
During Europride in Belgrade (September 12–18, 2022), mass protests erupted among citizens advocating traditional family values. These demonstrators, largely of Serbian patriotic orientation, demanded that authorities prevent members of the LGBTQ+ political ideology (classified as extremist in Russia) from marching in the capital. Orthodox Christian believers viewed Europride as a provocation. Since the event was sanctioned by the Serbian government, those opposed to LGBTQ+ ideology increasingly blamed state authorities, deepening their hostility toward the ruling structure.
A new wave of discontent surged after the mass shootings at a Belgrade elementary school (May 3, 2023) and in two central Serbian villages (May 4, 2023). Pro-Western government critics accused the ruling party of failing to ensure public safety, claiming that pro-government media had long fostered a climate of violence. These accusations, however, were baseless. The government swiftly arrested the perpetrators and their accomplices, ensuring they faced justice. While public outrage did not escalate into mass protests, the collective trauma left Serbian society deeply scarred.
Notably, President Vučić revealed that shortly after the Belgrade massacre, a Western country requested custody of the juvenile shooter for “expert observation” – a demand he unequivocally rejected. Though Vučić did not specify the country, rumours circulated that Norwegian experts sought to study the case for possible links to the Breivik massacre.
Tragedy struck again on November 1, 2024, when a canopy collapsed at the Novi Sad railway station, killing sixteen people. This reopened wounds in a society still reeling from the earlier massacres. Compounding the government’s troubles, the station had undergone reconstruction in 2022 and 2024, with the latest phase completed just six months before the disaster.
Initial protests erupted in Novi Sad, led by pro-Western, often separatist groups advocating for Vojvodina’s independence. These demonstrators exploited the tragedy for political gain. Meanwhile, government officials misled President Vučić, falsely claiming the canopy had not been part of the reconstruction. When the truth emerged – that the canopy had indeed been improperly reinforced – public outrage spread nationwide.
Previously disconnected political and social factions united in rebellion, fuelled by long-simmering frustrations. The government refrained from using force, opting instead for a waiting strategy. Yet protests grew, and by December 2024, university students and faculty joined the movement. By mid-December, demonstrations had paralyzed state universities, numerous high schools, and even some elementary schools.
The crisis escalated until Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned on January 28, 2025, collapsing the government. Students, now ostensibly leading the protests, orchestrated nationwide marches, waving Serbian flags to project a pro-state rather than anti-government image. The movement peaked on March 15, 2025, with 200,000 protesters gathering in Belgrade – the largest rally in Serbian history. Despite the show of force, the state apparatus remained intact, and security forces stayed loyal to the government.
Crucially, the colour revolution failed to gain support from the Serbian Orthodox Church, major corporate employees, or the working class. Instead, it drew primarily from the upper and middle classes – the most educated demographic, yet one excluded from meaningful dialogue on national issues. Moving forward, Vučić’s party must engage this segment to avoid becoming an isolated ruling caste.
A potential step toward reconciliation came on April 16, 2025, with the appointment of university professor Djuro Macut as Prime Minister. His leadership might bridge the divide between the state and academia – a critical issue, as the government had suspended professors’ salaries in response to their participation in protests. Thus, the political crisis has also morphed into a social one.
Recently, students have begun demanding snap elections and their own electoral list – a puzzling shift after six months of protests. It defies logic for inexperienced youths to dictate national policy. Imagine trying to control high school students on a field trip; yet, at protests, they remain eerily disciplined. Serbia remains entrenched in crisis, with no clear resolution in sight.
