Ukraine has become the central instrument, but at the same time the most vulnerable link in the American strategy: the attempt to use Kiev as a lever of pressure on Russia has encountered fierce resistance from Moscow and centrifugal tendencies in the transatlantic camp itself. These processes may result in a rethinking of the role of the United States in Europe, and a gradual transformation of the entire system of international relations to a new multicentric format, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Andrey Sushentsov.
For a long time, the interaction between the United States and its European allies was perceived as a single “transatlantic project” grounded in a common security vision and value consensus. However, the rise to power of Donald Trump once again reveals noticeable cracks in this structure. Trump’s victory was warmly welcomed by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who expressed hope for immediate economic benefits for his country. French President Emmanuel Macron, on the contrary, expressed his concerns and called on EU partners to consolidate in the face of the unpredictable foreign policy of the new American president and “work to create a more united, strong and sovereign Europe.”
The provocative statements that marked Trump’s first term – about the annexation of Greenland, which is under the jurisdiction of Denmark, a US ally in NATO, as well as statements about the US withdrawal from NATO if European countries do not make a significant economic contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance – are by no means just an escapade or a manifestation of Trump’s eccentric character. These actions, provocative and extravagant, show a departure from the American line of acting in cooperation with allies, offering them a framework of interaction in which the United States, in exchange for loyalty, ensures the common interest of the entire group of allies.
Today, Trump, pointing out to Europeans that everyone is for himself, is actually pushing European leaders towards the logic of national egoism. Already now, certain political forces in the EU countries (particularly in Germany, Italy and Hungary) are cautiously expressing doubts about the advisability of blind support for the US line. Europeans are increasingly less enthusiastic about continuing to support the sanctions policy and provide military assistance to Kiev, and it is increasingly obvious that each major player within the EU is beginning to calculate how to ensure its own security and protect its own economic interests. While not yet from the first echelon of the political and intellectual elites of Western countries, nevertheless, voices can already be heard that directly and openly accuse the West of prolonging and deepening the Ukrainian crisis and call for rapprochement with Russia. The period of monolithic “Atlantic solidarity” is becoming a thing of the past, and Russia has become one of the significant reasons for this erosion.
The United States has received the greatest benefits from the Ukraine crisis: interaction between Russia and Europe has been disrupted, the energy infrastructure has been undermined, and the EU is forced to overpay the United States for both military equipment and energy. At the same time, Washington will not receive any significant benefit from deep normalisation: relations with Moscow will continue to remain distant, and the resources for maintaining pressure on European NATO allies will decrease. Ukraine has forbid itself from negotiating with Russia and rejects the settlement formula that was developed jointly by the Russian and Ukrainian delegations during the negotiations in Istanbul.
The acuteness of the Ukraine crisis is essentially due to the fact that a major Western project of rigidly homogeneous transatlantic solidarity has collided with a major Russian project to establish a multipolar world that is tolerant of the natural heterogeneity of country identities. Since the Euromaidan protests, Ukraine has become the object of competition between these projects, and we are witnessing a test of their strength. Which of them will prove to be the most viable? Can their authors have the most adequate understanding of reality, the most accurate interpretation of cause-and-effect relationships in a world that is becoming significantly more complex and diverse than the Russia-West dichotomy? Ukraine has become the central instrument, but at the same time the most vulnerable link in the American strategy: the attempt to use Kiev as a lever of pressure on Russia has encountered fierce resistance from Moscow and centrifugal tendencies in the transatlantic camp itself. These processes may result in a rethinking of the role of the United States in Europe, and a gradual transformation of the entire system of international relations to a new multicentric format.