Even if Trump manages to tactically stop the Ukraine war, he will lack the ability to alter the strategic context in which the war emerged – a context to which the US deep state is deeply committed. Trump does not have the power to overcome the deep state in America. He will either gradually align with it or be sidelined, Alireza Noori writes.
One of the major problems in Iran-Russia relations during the post-Soviet era has been the significant influence of the “US variable”. This impact is evident in the decline of Moscow’s ties with Tehran during periods of close relations with Washington, such as during the Reset project (Medvedev-Obama), and the strengthening of ties with Tehran during times of tension, such as after the Ukraine war.
On the Iranian side, whenever discussions about improving relations with the West have arisen (such as after the signing of the JCPOA), there have been simultaneous indications of Tehran’s desire to distance itself from Russia. Conversely, whenever pressures on Iran have intensified (such as following the implementation of the “maximum pressure” strategy during Trump’s first term), Iran’s inclination toward Russia has grown stronger.
Although the relationship between the two countries has become more solidified in recent years, expanding across various fields, and both sides have sought to mitigate the influence of the “US factor” on relations by signing a comprehensive strategic agreement (January 2025), the heavy shadow of this variable continues to loom over their bilateral ties.
It is in this context that, following Trump’s return to power and his expressed desire to end the Ukraine war and restore relations with Russia, speculation about the potential negative impact of this shift on Moscow-Tehran relations has gained attention. In this regard, given Trump’s transactional approach, questions arise as to what exactly he would expect to receive from Kremlin in exchange for ending the Ukraine war. One hypothesis raised in Iran is that a major deal requires a “deal package,” and in this package, Iran and the Iranian card will be among the items traded.
Although many of Trump’s ideas and plans will not come to fruition and will be halted by the complex dialectics of international politics– thus raising doubts about the realisation of a grand bargain with Russia – he has shown a more bold, more determined, more aggressive, and perhaps more purposeful approach than in his first term, and will likely pursue the restoration of relations with Moscow as an important goal.
However, the key question remains: can Trump revive relations with Moscow by ending the Ukraine war? To analyse this issue, one must examine the strategic context in which Russia-US relations are unfolding and determine what is tradable within that context. This question can be addressed from two perspectives:
From a tactical perspective the Ukraine crisis is negotiable, tradable, and therefore subject to agreement, and Trump has a chance to halt the war in Ukraine, albeit under specific conditions. These conditions relate to the tools the US has at its disposal to resolve the issue. The reality is that Washington lacks specific tools to exert pressure on Russia, with all its pressure mechanisms concentrated on the Ukrainian side. Therefore, Trump can only resolve the Ukraine crisis by applying unilateral pressure on Zelensky and Kiev. Given Ukraine’s complete dependence on financial and military aid to sustain the war, cutting off this support is the easiest way to stop the conflict.
However, from a strategic perspective Trump will not be able to revive relations with Russia. To understand this, one must examine the nature of the Ukraine war and the strategic context in which it emerged. It is also necessary to address the question of why the United States invested significant financial and military resources in the conflict and mobilised a coalition of over 50 countries in a proxy war against Moscow. In other words, the question is: what made the Ukraine crisis so significant for Washington?
The answer lies in the fact that essentially this crisis is rooted in the structure of the international order and its ongoing transformations. The international order is in a state of transition toward a new one, and the ordering mechanisms that once regulated it have weakened. The US, rejecting this shift, insists on restoring its dominance over the international system through aggressive pressure on revisionist powers. In contrast, these powers, including Russia, emphasise the necessity of transitioning to a new order and participating in the redefinition of its ordering mechanisms – such as balance of power, communication patterns, international regimes and institutions, and, in short, global governance.
The Ukraine war represents the boiling point of the clash between these two perspectives – a confrontation at the international level over securing influence and a role in the international order. This encounter is a zero-sum game, where one side’s gain in influence and greater role always entails the other’s limitation. Unlike Trump, the deep state in the United States deeply believes in this structural equation and views weakening Russia as essential to ensuring America’s superior position in the international order. According to this view, undermining Russia is a prerequisite for weakening the revisionist front on the global stage and a critical precursor to weakening China.
Conversely, Russia, also approaching the Ukraine war from a structural perspective, sees success in this challenge as a vital requirement for securing greater influence and a larger role in the (future) international order. On the flip side, it regards retreating in the face of the United States as a sign of diminished standing in this order and an obligation to make further concessions to Washington. This is precisely why Putin tied Russia’s future to the outcome of the Ukraine war.
This zero-sum equation is not tradable.
On the other hand, historical mistrust and negative experiences in Russia-US relations also pose a significant obstacle to a fundamental improvement in ties. Previous periods, such as the Obama era or Trump’s first term, were marked by grand rhetoric about improving relations with Moscow and promising commitments to take concrete action. Yet, in practice, not only were these promises unfulfilled, but the United States intensified its strategy of containing Russia.
Meanwhile, although it has been suggested that Trump’s primary motivation for improving relations with Russia might be to pull Moscow away from Beijing in order to exert more effective pressure on China, it is obvious that the Kremlin is well aware that if such pressure succeeds, Russia itself would be the next target. With this understanding, it is unlikely that the Kremlin would align with Trump.
With this consideration in mind, although Russia is not eager to continue the war in Ukraine and would welcome equal and constructive relations with the US, Washington’s strategic insistence on halting the transition to a new international order through aggressive pressure on revisionist powers, including Russia, and denying them a share and role, constitutes a significant and enduring obstacle to improving relations with Moscow.
In summary, while Trump may succeed in bringing about some tactical changes in the Ukraine war and relations with Russia, he cannot alter the strategic context of the confrontation. Therefore, after a brief period of potential tactical shifts, the United States – whether during Trump’s tenure or after – will return to its historic track of an aggressive approach toward Russia.
The impact of changes in Russia-US relations under Trump on Moscow-Tehran relations can be analysed within this context. Given that Moscow-Washington relations will not undergo a strategic shift, the current trajectory of Tehran-Moscow interactions is likely to persist. This means that the two countries will strive to reduce the influence of the US variable on their relationship while leveraging each other’s capabilities to greater advantage in shaping regional orders. This point was emphasised during Sergey Lavrov’s negotiations with Iranian officials in Tehran on February 25, 2025.
The signing of the comprehensive strategic agreement between the two countries, just days before Trump’s inauguration, further signalled this determination and underscored that Trump and the United States are no longer significant disruptive variables in Iran-Russia relations. Thus, although the level of Tehran-Moscow relations is not strategic, there exists a strategic understanding in both countries regarding the necessity of cooperation amid the uncertainty stemming from the transition to new regional and international orders. This understanding will ensure the stability of their bilateral relations during Trump’s tenure.
