World Majority
The Impact of the Iran-Israel Conflict on the Situation in Ukraine and Russia-US Negotiations

The outbreak of the war between Israel and Iran on June 13 took all players by surprise - both regional and major powers with interests and a presence in the Middle East. Russia today, despite regime change in Syria, remains a key player. It has a strategic partnership with Iran and close trade and investment relations with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are members of BRICS, and together with Qatar they act as mediators with regards to Ukraine. The Russian President was very warmly welcomed in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The first foreign visits Vladimir Putin made following the start of the Special Military Operation were to the Gulf. Despite all the "buts" and "ifs", the Russian Federation and Israel continue to maintain their partnership.

The aggravation of the situation in the Middle East, which has been further fuelled by US strikes on nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, poses a direct threat to Russian interests. Of course, one can speculate regarding the rise in oil prices and the distraction of the West's attention from Ukraine, but there is the risk of a complete destabilisation of the Middle East.

If we take Iran separately, then due to strikes by Israel and the US, Russia risks being left without a key partner-ally. Although Russian bases remain in Latakia, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has shaken Moscow's position in the region. Iran's capitulation would weaken Russia even more. Moscow and Tehran often coordinate their positions; they fought ISIS (banned in Russia) and Islamists in Syria side by side. With Russia's support, Iran was accepted into the SCO and BRICS. In exchange for sympathy on issues that are most important to them, such as sanctions and the nuclear program, Iran has acted as Russia's ally in Ukraine, supplying Moscow with drones.

The Iranians, of course, are great, having worked for years to ensure their defence capabilities, and having created ballistic missiles and drones that even Western countries envy, but Russia has also contributed to this matter. Iran is armed with S-300 air defence systems, and its tanks are mostly T-72s. The Iranian air force is equipped with Mi-171 and Mi-17 helicopters, Il-76 and An-140 transport aircraft, as well as MiG-29 fighters and Su-24 bombers. Russia, according to Putin, has offered to increase cooperation in creating an air defence system, but the Iranians have slowed down the process. As a result, Iran does not have the latest  Triumph air defence systems it desperately needs.

In economic terms, there is a lot of additional potential for trade. Trade turnover between Russia and Iran is currently a modest $5 billion. Iran's main partners are China, the UAE, Turkey and Iraq. But trade is growing, in 2024 it grew by 16%. Western sanctions have not slowed this down; they have stimulated the strengthening of ties. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed three days before Trump's inauguration should also contribute to this. Iran and Russia are implementing their "silk road" in the form of the North-South International Transport Corridor. The presidents of the two countries have expressed a desire to build a gas pipeline from Russia to the Islamic Republic. Russia is participating in Iran's nuclear program, helping it build a nuclear power plant in Bushehr.

Economic Statecraft – 2025
‘Declaration of Dependency’: How and Why Europe and the US Try to Put Economic Pressure on Israel
Elizaveta Yakimova
The government of Benjamin Netanyahu is facing a threat to economic relations with three partners at once - the US, the EU and Great Britain. Despite their different measures of influence on Israel, they are united by their focus on solving Western, rather than Middle Eastern problems, while demonstrating the critical level of Israeli dependence on Europe and the US, which hinders West Jerusalem’s search for foreign trade alternatives.
Opinions

The destabilisation of Iran would be a blow to existing trade and investment ties with Russia, and result in the collapse of the aforementioned transport and energy projects. If a puppet regime comes to power, Iran will reorient itself towards the West, and other countries would become more oriented towards them due to the dominance of the United States. Trump is already trying to lure the Persian Gulf states to his side, irritating even allies in Israel, and he has managed to attract trillions in investment to the American economy.

Washington will have greater leverage and will be able, in theory, to convince OPEC countries to stop coordinating oil policy with Russia. Washington will expect the Saudis and the Emiratis to leave BRICS. At least by the standards of the Middle East, we will see a return to a unipolar world, dealing a blow to the “Global Majority” or “Global South” project promoted by Russia.

The collateral damage of a full-scale US war against Iran could be mass migration and the threat of terrorism spreading to the neighbouring South Caucasus.

The intensity of US involvement in the Iran-Israel conflict may affect the prospects for normalising relations between Washington and Moscow as well as the Ukraine conflict. For now, the Kremlin has not broken ties with the White House, and appreciates Trump's efforts to resolve the Ukraine conflict. Trump calls Putin and discusses the Middle East conflict with him. At the same time, it is impossible not to notice that negotiations to restore diplomatic relations have been put on hold. Partly because the US is distracted by Israel, and partly because of the obvious divergence of positions between Moscow and Washington with regards to Iran.

If Trump fully engages in the fight against Iran and switches from strikes on nuclear facilities to bombing the army, defence industry, and administrative buildings, the process of normalising relations with Moscow will collapse. Such US actions do not fit into Putin's concept of a multipolar world, for which he has openly fought since the Munich Security Conference in 2007. Here it does not matter much how Trump personally feels about Putin. The Kremlin will no longer have incentives to make even minimal concessions in the Istanbul talks. With the US tied up in Iran - and this will certainly happen (Iran is not Iraq!) - Russia will have new opportunities on the Ukrainian front, and territorial acquisitions may not be limited to Sumy and Kharkov. Seeing that Trump does not want to play by any rules, Putin also has the right to refuse them. In the Middle East conflict itself, Moscow will do everything it can to ensure that the US gets as deeply bogged down as possible and gets its next Vietnam.

In a relatively "peaceful scenario", with Israel continuing its war with Iran and a gradual reduction in US aggression, Russia is unlikely to spoil relations with the White House administration. At a meeting with the heads of news agencies on June 19, the Russian president said that in his opinion, Trump "sincerely seeks to resolve" the conflict in Ukraine. The statement was made before the US strikes on Iran, but this position of the Kremlin seems to remain in force for now. Russia hopes that reason will prevail in the Oval Office despite all attempts by Netanyahu and US hawks Hegseth, Rubio and Murdoch to drag the United States into a long-term and full-fledged war. By providing some kind of advance to Trump, Russia is not sitting idly by. Putin's words about the Iranian people rallying around the government, and the underground nuclear facilities being safe and sound, clearly indicate his readiness to support the IRI. Before the US attack, he called Xi Jinping and together with him condemned Israel's actions. At a meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the Russian president announced the efforts that Russia is making to assist the Iranian people. This is a signal that if Trump tries to topple the Iranian government, the Russian-Chinese tandem will resist. Pakistan may join in. The three countries are presenting a united front in the UN Security Council.

Russia's support for Iran is not emotional and reckless, like Trump's support for Israel, but its potential should not be underestimated.

No legal obstacles can prevent Moscow from providing all the necessary assistance to Iran - from intelligence data to S-400 air defence systems. Putin is doing everything in Russia's power to stop a new wave of chaos in the Middle East. He is in touch with the leaders of the warring countries, Trump, Erdogan, and the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Russia has "specific proposals," Putin noted at the SPIEF. Given that Trump spoke about the possibility of Russia's participation during the Oman talks, Moscow's mediation is still real. The Kremlin is in contact with Trump, Netanyahu, and Pezeshkian. Moscow's successful mediation will make the relationship between Trump and Putin even more trusting. It must be noted that even with the confrontational Obama administration, the Kremlin was able to agree in 2013 to withdraw chemical weapons from Syria and eliminated the threat of NATO invasion.

The main conclusion for Russia from Trump's behaviour in the Iran-Israel war is not that the US president is very inconsistent and unpredictable, but that he truly respects strength. That is why, even if the positive atmosphere in bilateral relations is maintained, Russia needs to act even more from a position of strength in the Istanbul format. If Moscow offers a gesture of goodwill and withdraws troops, as it did in 2022, Trump will perceive it as weakness and will put pressure on Moscow.

Modern Diplomacy
The Ukrainian Crisis as a Testing Ground for American Strategy
Andrey Sushentsov
Ukraine has become the central instrument, but at the same time the most vulnerable link in the American strategy: the attempt to use Kiev as a lever of pressure on Russia has encountered fierce resistance from Moscow and centrifugal tendencies in the transatlantic camp itself. These processes may result in a rethinking of the role of the United States in Europe, and a gradual transformation of the entire system of international relations to a new multicentric format, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Andrey Sushentsov.
Opinions
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.