Valdai Club

The participation of the Global South in resolving Iran’s nuclear issue not only signifies support for Iran but also contributes to international diplomacy, global stability and security, multilateralism in the international arena, opposition to coercive tactics, peaceful conflict resolution, and the preservation of international regimes, including arms control, Alireza Noori writes.

Despite several rounds of negotiations between Iran and the United States over resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, the result remains mired in ambiguity. In the latest remarks, Iran’s Supreme Leader has expressed deep scepticism about the prospect of any outcome. On the other side, US officials have reiterated their demand for zero enrichment – a red line for Iran – thereby intensifying the stalemate. The continued emphasis on this position signals a potential deadlock, raising the likelihood of non-diplomatic scenarios playing out. Among other issues, what appears to be significant yet underexamined is the absence of the Global South and its major powers in contributing to the resolution of this matter.

The term “Global South,” as a substitute for terms such as “Third World” or “Developing Countries” (which have had a reactive connotation) carries a proactive and constructive dimension. That is, the Global South not only criticises injustice, inequality, and unilateralism in the international relations, but also seeks to construct a more balanced and just global system. From this perspective, the Global South represents an active and innovative identity that regards the reform of global governance as its mission.

In this context, Russia and China, as two major powers of the Global South, have emphasised this identity and mission more than others. At the 2023 BRICS summit (as an institution of the Global South), President Putin stated that BRICS countries oppose all forms of “hegemony” and “neo-colonial policies,” and are jointly seeking to address global challenges based on the principles of equality and mutual respect.

In the final declaration of the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, the organisation explicitly reaffirmed its commitment to a more representative, fairer international order and a reinvigorated and reformed multilateral system. Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged solidarity with Russia, saying that “amid the international counter-current of unilateralism and hegemonic bullying, China will work with Russia to shoulder the special responsibilities of major world powers.”

The extent to which these statements and the role of the Global South in international politics are effective or merely symbolic can be assessed by examining its engagement in two major recent international developments.

First, the recent confrontation between Pakistan and India: although India is a member of BRICS (alongside China and Russia), the bloc played virtually no role in addressing this conflict – a confrontation that had the potential to escalate into a large-scale war affecting 1.6 billion people, with significant regional and international consequences. It merely issued an ineffective diplomatic statement by its foreign ministers, with a verbal emphasis on the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Even more striking is the fact that although both India and Pakistan are official members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (another institution of the Global South), the organisation did not take any action in response to the crisis between its member states – not even issuing a statement. Given institutional norms, the SCO would have been expected to intervene through mediation or at least by convening an emergency meeting. It was within this vacuum of inaction that the United States positioned itself as the main mediator and key actor in the reconciliation process between India and Pakistan.

The second is Iran’s nuclear issue; it is not unreasonable to expect the Global South and its institutions to intervene in this case. On the one hand, Iran’s nuclear issue is an international matter and falls within the scope of Global South concerns. On the other, Iran maintains close relations with its Global South powers, including Russia and China, and is a member of both SCO and BRICS as two Global South institutions. However, while the United States has explicitly threatened the use of force to resolve Iran’s nuclear issue through the binary choice of “either imposed agreement or bombing,” there has not been an effective reaction in this regard from the Global South.

Similar to the case of India and Pakistan, the Global South has also ceded the field to the United States on this issue. This implies acceptance of the format favoured by the US, namely “one minus five” or “one minus all.” It means that the issue will be handled by the US alone.

The inaction of the Global South on these two critical issues effectively amounts to tacit support for US unilateralism – precisely the very issue that the Global South has consistently criticised. This is despite the fact that, on one hand, the Global South claims to advocate for reforming global governance and opposes unilateralism, while on the other, the Global South and its powers, including Russia and China as permanent members of the UN Security Council and key actors in the P5+1 format of the JCPOA, possess significant capacity to help resolve Iran’s nuclear issue.

Aware of these capacities, Iran has consistently emphasised the involvement of Moscow and Beijing in the nuclear negotiations. After the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the imposition of a maximum pressure campaign, they not only rejected this approach but also aligned with Tehran in stressing that maximum pressure would provoke negative reactions and further complicate the matter. In order to prevent this outcome, they have supported the preservation of the JCPOA in international forums and institutions, including the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, through diplomacy and economic cooperation with Iran, they have sought to alleviate the pressures and keep the window for a diplomatic resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue open. 

In 2021, China signed a long-term agreement with Iran, and in 2022, Russia concluded a comprehensive strategic partnership with Tehran that encompasses strengthening economic, political, security, cultural, and other ties. By signing these agreements, they have demonstrated that, on the one hand, they oppose the US portrayal of Iran as a “threat,” and on the other, they view Iran as a “normal” actor with whom cooperation within the framework of international law is possible. More importantly, both countries support strengthening Iran’s relations with Global South institutions, including the SCO and BRICS, which reflects a distinct approach to Iran and opposition to its isolation.

Given the sensitivity of Iran’s nuclear issue, Russia and China’s opposition to Trump’s “either agreement or bombing” ultimatum, and their support for achieving a balanced agreement must take on a more practical dimension. This means an agreement based on the JCPOA framework, incorporating flexibility and mutual concessions – Iran accepting limitations on its nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of restrictions on its international activities, especially sanctions. At the present juncture, their role is critically important for at least three reasons:

1. Illegal demands by the United States: Although the positions of US officials – from Trump to Witkoff and Rubio – initially showed some contradictions, their unified stance on zero enrichment constitutes an illegal demand and a red line for Iran that could lead to a deadlock in the negotiations. Iran considers enrichment a right under international treaties and the core of its nuclear programme, without which the programme would be meaningless. The role of Russia and China in moderating these illegal and politicised demands is crucial.

2. The possibility of a worse scenario: Although military threats are primarily a tool of pressure against Iran, they should not be overlooked. Iran would respond extensively to any attack, which could lead to unpredictable consequences for the region and even the international arena. Like Iran, China and Russia are staunchly opposed to the military option, and their opposition – expressed within the Security Council and various regional and international institutions – can help remove this option from the US agenda.

3. The snapback mechanism: The possible activation of this mechanism, which would reinstate all UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, effectively marks the official end of the JCPOA and any new agreement. Under such a scenario, Iran would have nothing to lose, making the closure of diplomatic avenues, radical action, and increased tensions foreseeable. Russia and China have the capacity to counter this worst-case scenario.

As noted, Iran considers a stable and balanced nuclear agreement to be the best and most desirable outcome for itself and is opposed to other scenarios, for example, the activation of the snapback mechanism. Iran assigns a special role to the Global South, particularly Russia and China, in preventing adverse scenarios. Therefore, unlike Washington – which seeks a “1-5” format excluding Europe, Russia, and China from the negotiations – Tehran insists on the “P5+1” format or a wider one.

Therefore, although Tehran pragmatically views direct negotiations with the United States as an opportunity to achieve a balanced agreement faster and assert its rights, this does not imply that it considers the US the sole actor in resolving the issue. Accordingly, alongside negotiations with the US, Tehran emphasises maintaining contacts with Moscow and Beijing. The Global South and its powers, including Russia and China, should also activate their individual and institutional capacities – particularly within frameworks such as SCO and BRICS – and play a more innovative role in the nuclear issue, to prevent it from sliding into worse scenarios.

A multilateral format can reduce radical consequences and tensions in various scenarios. In the event of an agreement, China would play a key role in guaranteeing the lifting of sanctions, while Russia would be crucial in securing Iran’s nuclear rights; with their involvement, Iran is more likely to accept limitations. In the absence of an agreement, both countries could help de-escalate tensions.