Russia’s exclusive influence in the region is being challenged by both external actors and regional states. This does not mean that Russia is exiting the South Caucasus, but its room for manoeuvre has significantly narrowed. The key for Russia is to manage the situation wisely, moving away from inertial thinking. Instead, Moscow should promote a pragmatic vision of a peaceful and stable neighbourhood, free from geopolitical illusions, Sergey Markedonov writes.
The South Caucasus has traditionally been one of the most dynamic regions of Eurasia. Following the collapse of the USSR, the former republics of Soviet Transcaucasia became the epicentre of the region’s ethnopolitical conflicts involving de facto states. It was here that the Belovezha Accords, which established the key principles for post-Soviet demarcation by transforming administrative borders between former Soviet republics into interstate borders, were effectively revised in August 2008.
However, between 2020 and 2025, the South Caucasus has experienced such a significant number of geopolitical shifts that it raises the question of whether the region is undergoing a qualitative transformation of its regional order.
New balance of power in the region
First and foremost, it is important to highlight that during this brief period, the military-political status quo in the region shifted twice. The Second Karabakh War (September–November 2020) radically disrupted a balance of power that had persisted for 26 years. The significance of this event extends beyond a single ethnopolitical conflict. It is not merely that Azerbaijan avenged past defeats and regained control over most of its lost territories.
Turkey’s role in the Caucasus also saw a substantial increase. For the first time, a state with no historical ties to the USSR played a pivotal role in reshaping post-Soviet geopolitical realities. The immediate consequence of Turkey’s involvement in the Karabakh conflict was not only the strengthening of the Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic alliance but also the expansion of military-technical cooperation between Turkey, Ukraine, and Central Asian states, as well as the revitalization of the Organisation of Turkic States. In September 2023, Azerbaijan established full sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to the premature withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces seven months later. Russia’s traditional role as the exclusive moderator in the peaceful settlement of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict has effectively ended. Instead, Turkey’s influence on both sides of the conflict has grown – through enhanced military-political cooperation with Azerbaijan and diplomatic pressure on Armenia, including preconditions for signing a peace agreement.
Turkey’s rise has sparked significant concerns in Iran, which has sought to expand its diplomatic presence in Armenia (e.g., opening a consulate in Kapan in October 2022) while clearly delineating its “red lines.” Iran has framed the proposed Zangezur corridor – a road connecting mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan through Armenia’s Syunik region – as a threat to its national interests.
In 2020, many observers predicted a decline in the influence of the US and EU in the Caucasus. However, these predictions did not materialize. With the onset of Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine, the West froze cooperation with Russia on the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement, as the OSCE Minsk Group became completely ineffective. While earlier disagreements between Moscow, Washington, and Brussels centred on Georgia’s potential NATO membership, after 2022, the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement became another diplomatic battleground.
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan: “Changing landmarks” in foreign policy
The accelerated geopolitical dynamics in the South Caucasus have rendered traditional analytical frameworks for understanding the region’s balance of power obsolete. Until 2020, Armenia was viewed as Russia’s outpost in the South Caucasus. However, in January 2025, Yerevan signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership with Washington. Concurrently, the Armenian government began discussing steps toward organizing a referendum on European integration. The Armenian leadership has not only criticized the CSTO – a recurring theme in the past – but has also labeled the organization a threat to national security. Amid this criticism, Russia’s military presence in Armenia has been significantly reduced, with border guards withdrawn from Zvartnots Airport and the Armenian-Iranian border checkpoint. This presence, which lasted 32 years, has nearly ended, leaving only the 102nd military base in Gyumri. Armenia’s aspiration to join the EU, now a key foreign policy goal, also casts doubt on its continued membership in the EAEU. If European integration accelerates, Yerevan’s withdrawal from the Eurasian Economic Union may become inevitable.
In contrast, Georgia, long considered the primary conduit for US, EU, and NATO interests in the Caucasus, has adopted a more complex foreign policy stance. After the European Parliament effectively rejected the legitimacy of Georgia’s parliamentary elections, Tbilisi announced a “freeze” on European integration talks. The US-initiated suspension of the 2009 Charter on Strategic Partnership further strained relations. Western partners have criticized Georgia for adopting Russian-style legislation on foreign agents and promoting “traditional values,” while Russia has abolished visa requirements for Georgian citizens (after nearly 23 years) and resumed direct flights. In September 2023, Georgia eliminated entry visas for Chinese citizens, and in February 2024, China reciprocated by allowing Georgians a 30-day visa-free stay. Georgian-Chinese relations were officially declared strategic. Despite this diversification, Tbilisi has not entirely abandoned European and Euro-Atlantic integration, though these goals no longer appear to be an idée fixe.
Azerbaijan has always occupied a unique position in the South Caucasus, skilfully balancing relations with the West, Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Russia. Against the backdrop of deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations and Moscow’s de facto neutrality in the 2020 and 2023 conflicts between Baku and Yerevan, it seemed that Russia and Azerbaijan were destined to grow closer. This was underscored by the February 22, 2022, Moscow Declaration on Allied Cooperation, signed just days before Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine. However, this “geopolitical compensation” failed to materialize. The Aktau air tragedy, for which Baku blamed Russia, highlighted the fragility of their strategic partnership and the underlying tensions in bilateral relations.
This incident underscored the divergent approaches of the two states on issues ranging from Ukraine to the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Baku-Ankara alliance has strengthened, particularly following the 2021 Shusha Declaration, which elevated their mutual defence and security commitments. This has bolstered Turkey’s role in the Caspian region and Central Asia, while advancing the Organisation of Turkic States as a key integration project.
Risks and opportunities for Russia
The Caucasus is undergoing dramatic changes. Five years ago, it could unequivocally be described as a Russian sphere of special interest and priority influence. This position remained intact despite the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, which drew unprecedented support for Georgia from the US, EU, and NATO, and the 2016 “four-day war” in Karabakh, after which Russia’s exclusive role as a mediator was acknowledged by the West, Turkey, and Iran. Even the events of 2020, which led to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh, were initially perceived in the US and Europe as a consolidation of Moscow’s influence. The logic was simple: before November 2020, there were no Russian troops in Karabakh; afterward, there were.
Today, however, Russia’s exclusive influence is being challenged by both external actors and regional states. This does not mean that Russia is exiting the South Caucasus, but its room for maneuver has significantly narrowed. Nevertheless, the evolving geopolitical landscape presents not only risks but also opportunities for Russia. First, the lack of regional integration and the absence of a unified approach among external players on how to “arrange” the Caucasus create openings for Moscow. Second, despite strained relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan and the absence of diplomatic ties with Georgia, Russia remains one of the top three economic partners for all South Caucasus states. Third, security and sovereignty considerations remain paramount. The key for Russia is to manage the situation wisely, moving away from inertial thinking (the “they won’t go anywhere” mind-set no longer applies). Instead, Moscow should promote a pragmatic vision of a peaceful and stable neighbourhood, free from geopolitical illusions.
