The term "strategic autonomy" was first mentioned in the French White Paper on Defence in 1994 and referred to the creation of conditions for reducing dependence on NATO and the concept of nuclear deterrence.
Since 2013, the European Union has been talking about strategic autonomy in the context of strengthening the European security industry. Although it is unclear, strategic autonomy has been one of the objectives of the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy since 2016. Thus, from the defence industry, the use of the term extends to foreign policy. The European Council defines strategic autonomy as "the ability to act independently when and where necessary, and with partners where possible." EU High Representative Josep Borrell once warned that “Europe risks becoming irrelevant” and strategic autonomy was, in his words, “a question of survival”, while French President Emmanuel Macron has said that “Europe could become a third pole vis-à-vis the US and China” and that “strategic autonomy is the key to avoid becoming vassals.” This was supposed to mean that “the EU will act in the interests of Europe, not in the interests of the US.” However, the attempt to regulate the EU’s relations with the US turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle to further developing the concept and achieving strategic autonomy. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy was created to coordinate the strategic objectives of member states and develop a common approach, but NATO remains the key to continental security.
Managing the relationship between the EU and NATO, i.e. between the leading European states that sought more space for independent action in international relations, and the US, has become difficult to resolve in the years since the publication of the EU Global Strategy. The confusion has been reinforced by proposals explaining that the implementation of strategic autonomy is in fact strengthening the transatlantic partnership and the link between Brussels and Washington. Notably, in the absence of an answer to the question of how to formulate a common foreign and security policy, the EU has been more focused on specifying the concept in other areas, such as access to essential raw materials. Therefore, despite the statements of Borrell and Macron, the EU says little and works even less to specify the foreign policy dimension of strategic autonomy.
From a theoretical point of view, strategic autonomy includes three elements: strategic security, strategic economy and strategic culture. What does this mean for the EU today?
Second, the ongoing inflation is not the result of the pandemic or the conflict in Ukraine, but the result of systemic errors made in relying on the financial sector as a generator of economic growth. Money is constantly printed, an approach adopted by the US Federal Reserve, and loans are increased, the expediency of which is highly questionable.
Third, since the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, there has been a significant outflow of European investors from Europe. Investors are moving to other parts of the world, where energy is cheaper, where there is more confidence and there is no fear of radical change. Many academic papers still treat Europe as an economic giant, which may be statistically true. But when viewed from the perspective of the real economy and the processes that are currently underway, this giant is on its knees. In addition, the European economy lacks stable access to cheap energy and essential raw materials for technological development. At the moment, the green agenda is proving to be an expensive and highly uncertain alternative. Maybe in twenty years it could be possible, but what will the world look like in twenty years? Will the European Union be able to survive until then?
The next problem, perhaps the most dangerous in the long term, concerns the explanation of the functions of strategic autonomy by the EU institutions. A common foreign and security policy based on strategic autonomy is a necessity because the spread of “the politics of fear is a challenge to European values and the European way of life.” What are European values? What is the European way of life? There is no agreement on this within the EU. In other words, a neoliberal discourse based on gender equality is persistently imposed as the strategic culture of the EU, which the majority of citizens of European countries simply do not accept. In the last six months, pro-LGBT laws have been adopted in Ukraine, Taiwan and Japan. The neoliberal discourse is not only about Europe, but also about the collective West as a whole. Elements of strategic culture are factors of social de-homogenisation.
The uniqueness and distinctiveness of a state policy is reflected not only in its potential military, economic and political power, geographical position or resources, but also in the general and constitutive definitions. The starting point of the concept of strategic culture is from the very beginning the idea that each country, stimulated by the influence of its own cultural identity, has a unique way of analysing, interpreting and responding to international reality. The aggressive propaganda of LGBT rights and freedoms and the relative justification of ‘European values’ have led to the de-homogenisation of Europe and the polarisation of European societies.
Our reality is that we have supranational institutions in Brussels, the legitimacy of which is disputed. They impose on us something of a strategic culture that most citizens do not want to accept. The European Union is destroying the foundations of European culture by abandoning the Christian tradition. Watch the opening of the Olympic Games in Paris. France has given immeasurably to the world, French culture has been a model by which other cultures were measured. Was any of this a great French culture represented at the opening of the Olympic Games? It wasn’t. We are presented with gender equality, an anti-Christian worldview, and a degenerate phase of cultural development that glorifies death instead of life. Yes, these supranational institutions from Brussels are introducing models that glorify death instead of life. What strategic autonomy does this give us? In relation to what can this strategic autonomy be realised? In relation to life?
In terms of the processes that have taken place over the past two decades, the European Union does not have a single element of strategic autonomy. However, Europe should not be written off so easily. Europe is important for the security of Eurasia; it is also important for the future of global processes and the establishment of new rules and principles in international relations. Because of this importance, Europe must achieve strategic autonomy. However, this Europe, which is important for the whole world, cannot be led by the European Union.
Given this dependence on the United States, it is not surprising that the European Union participated in the creation of the Ukraine crisis and contributed fully to the acceleration of the armed conflict. In previous years, it was often emphasised that the US goal is to wage a war against Russia to the last Ukrainian. Given the actions of the EU, as well as the accompanying attempts to radicalise the conflict in Ukraine, it may happen that the conflict escalates into a war between the US and Russia to the last European.
Of course, the security of Eurasia does not depend only on Europe. But the security of Western Eurasia is linked to the issue of Europe’s strategic autonomy. A strategic autonomy that exists today on paper, but does not exist in practice. It will not exist in practice until free and sovereign states are recreated in Europe. At the moment, we are far from this. But even the longest journeys begin with the first steps. The first steps here are connected with the actualisation of the topic of strategic autonomy of Europe, with clear definition in academic circles and exploitation in political circles.
