According to surveys, the most popular political party in Turkey is the opposition CHP (Republican People’s Party ) (33.1%), while the Justice and Development Party AKP is only second (30.2%). This makes it necessary to find ways to strengthen the position of the AKP and Erdogan personally and create favourable conditions for his nomination for president in the upcoming elections. One of the possible tools for this is to change the current constitution, writes Nubara Kuliyeva.
History of the issue
Since the early 2000s, there has been a gradual process of reforming the constitutional order of Turkey, which has actually laid the foundations for the implementation of the "constitutional revolution" of 2017 and the prospect of adopting a new basic law of the country today. At the same time, the main officially promoted goal of this process is the desire to abandon the political legacy of the era of military coups and adopt a "civil" constitution based on universal rights and freedoms.
The current Constitution of the Republic of Turkey of 1982 was adopted following the military coup of 1980, and as such, it grants a wide range of powers to the military within the country’s political system. However, to date, especially during the AKP’s rule, the country’s basic law has been amended at least 19 times (around 100 amendments were made, some of which have directly affected military governance and were aimed at weakening the role of the military, such as in 1999, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2017).
In short, in 2001, the process of weakening the National Security Council as the main institution of military influence within the country's political system began: the number of civilian members was increased and its decisions were made only advisory. The 2004 reforms affected several aspects of the existing influence of the military, namely their role in the education system, the judiciary, and control over state property. The 2007 reforms, which made possible the direct election of the President of the Republic and significantly expanded his powers within the political system, including by giving him the role of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, also seem significant in this context. The 2010 amendments affected issues of military justice, the highest level of the Armed Forces, and the functions of the Supreme Military Council. That is, we can say that the constitutional reforms of the 2001-2010 period formed the basis of the 2017 changes, as evidenced even by the proximity of the main elements subject to change in the two designated periods.
The 2017 changes (the latest) were distinguished by the fact that they actually consolidated the presidential system of governance in the country, which meant consolidating a critical level of power in the hands of the executive branch. It should be noted that at the initial stage, the transformation period was motivated primarily by the democratisation of the Turkish political system and the strengthening of civilian control in the context of integration into Western structures (NATO and the EU). After 2017, these changes took a clear course towards a qualitative reorganisation of the military administration in the context of the consolidation of the presidential system of governance in the country. Thus, we can say that the 2017 amendments fundamentally changed the process of political decision-making in Turkey, increasing the role of the president, which certainly affected how foreign policy was addressed and the choice of instruments for its implementation.
Erdogan’s weakening position and normalisation of relations with the Kurds
In 2023, Recep Tayyip Erdogan again took office as President of the Republic of Turkey, but won in the second round with only a 4% advantage. This was aggravated by the unpopularity of the representatives of the ruling coalition in the municipal elections, which was confirmed by the results of the 2024 elections, according to which opposition candidates won in the country’s major cities (Istanbul, Ankara, etc.). Moreover, the situation with the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, Erdogan’s main potential rival in the upcoming elections, had a negative impact on the popularity of the president and the ruling coalition.
This indicates a decrease in the level of trust in the Turkish leader and the ruling AKP he leads. According to MetroPOLL, Erdogan’s support among citizens has decreased by almost 5% over the year and as of March 2025 amounted to 42.8%. According to the latest polls, the most popular political party in the country is the opposition CHP (33.1%), while the AKP ranks second (30.2%).
All this makes it necessary to look for ways to strengthen the position of the AKP and Erdogan personally and create favourable conditions for his nomination for the presidency in the upcoming elections. One of the possible tools for this is to change the current constitution, which limits both the possibility of nomination for a third term and reduces the chances of obtaining the post in the event of nomination.
At the same time, on February 7, 2025, at a meeting of the Turkish pro-Kurdish DEM in Istanbul, a letter from Abdullah Ocalan, who is in prison, was read. The leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), banned and recognised as terrorist in Turkey, called on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve itself.
Ocalan’s statement was the result of the process of resolving the Kurdish issue that was resumed in October 2024. This became possible after the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, the partner of the Justice and Development Party in the ruling coalition, agreed to possible political concessions regarding Ocalan in exchange for the cessation of the PKK’s activities.
In May, the PKK, which has been in a state of armed confrontation with Turkey for more than forty years, announced its dissolution and readiness to lay down arms as part of the normalisation of relations with the Turkish side, which began after Ocalan’s call in February.
The intensification of the peace process with the Kurds raises the question of the possibility of constitutionally enshrining their status and rights in the new realities of Turkish society. However, according to the KONDA survey “Current Developments in the Kurdish Issue,” conducted in January 2025, only 8% of respondents believe it is possible to resolve the Kurdish issue through the constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity. Among Kurds surveyed, this solution is acceptable to 33% of respondents.
The essence of possible constitutional changes
The process of constitutional reform in Turkey has several driving forces - the ruling coalition, the opposition, and the Turkish Kurds. However, none of these forces can initiate and bring the process to a logical conclusion alone.
There are two possible options for Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s nomination for a third presidential term - snap elections or amendments to the country’s basic law. For both, at least 360 votes in parliament are needed, which the ruling coalition currently does not have. The AKP can get the missing votes at the expense of the pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). To do this, it is necessary to take into account the desire of the Kurds to constitutionally enshrine their status and rights.
The issue of constitutional reform is the subject of broad public debate and speculation, to prevent which Erdogan confirmed the impossibility of changing a number of basic principles, such as the unitary structure of the state, a single official language, the state flag and territorial integrity. There is also uncertainty regarding Erdogan’s possible plans to run for a third term. Representatives of the AKP at the highest level, such as Justice Minister Yilmaz Tunç, are talking about the possibility of a third presidential term for the Turkish leader, but he himself, against the backdrop of growing public discontent with such statements, has declared his unwillingness to run for a third term, trying to separate the process of adopting a new constitution from his possible re-election.
At the same time, Erdogan recently made a statement that constitutional reform is a necessity and that work on preparing a new text of the Constitution is already underway and will continue in close cooperation with representatives of various parties, public organisations and the general public. The President also announced the creation of a special commission of 10 lawyers to draft the text of the new basic law of Turkey.
Taking into account the designated domestic political context, possible areas of reform include:
Amending the first four articles concerning the definition of the concepts of the Turkish nation, people and state;
Amending Article 66, which links citizenship with a certain ethnicity;
The possibility of children whose native language is not Turkish receiving primary education in their native language;
Changing the procedure for electing the president from 50% + 1 vote to 40% + 1 vote.
At this stage, we are not talking about introducing a package of amendments, but about adopting a new text of the country’s constitution.