Despite the external dualism of the country’s political structure, the supra-governmental bodies allow for finding a stable balance between the interests of the individual and the state. Each of them essentially carries out the functions of a “guardian” in relation to the civil institutions under their jurisdiction, writes international lawyer Matvey Kiselev, a participant in the Valdai – New Generation project.
Donald Trump’s new term promises to be another test of strength for Tehran. The unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, the murder of Qasem Soleimani – all this is fresh in the memory of Iranian leaders. Compared to the first term of the newly-elected US president, the situation in the Middle East has worsened: the confrontation between Israel and structures friendly to Iran has reached a new level of cruelty. Despite the militant rhetoric of the election campaign, Trump’s team plans to come to a new nuclear deal, albeit through tough sanctions and other economic pressure. The aim to cut Tehran’s financial capabilities is to initiate internal unrest in order to persuade the leadership of the Islamic Republic to negotiate on American terms.
The essence of the political system of Iran lies in the coexistence of the power of the supra-governmental Supreme Leader and the fairly traditional representative democracy of the elected Majlis, as well as a secular government headed by the president. Despite the apparent inconsistency, this interconnected system has its own checks and balances, as well as a set of constitutional institutions, created mainly under the Rahbar (Supreme leader), which allow the latter to coordinate and supervise other branches of government as an arbitrator. The most significant bodies, provided by the constitution, are the following: the Council of Experts, the Supervisory Board and the Expediency Council.
The Council of Experts, according to Chapter 8 of the Constitution of Iran, is a collegial advisory body, the main purpose of which is to elect the Rahbar and subsequently supervise his activities. Based on the internal regulations, the Council has 6 specialised commissions under its control, ensuring its activities. The requirements for the candidate for the post of the head of state are mainly of a theological and moral nature, set out in Articles 5 and 109 of the constitution. The Council consists of 88 faqihs, and the religious requirements for candidates reflect the exceptional weight of Article 4 of the constitution – the supremacy of Islam. Regardless of religious specificity, the members of the council are elected by popular vote for an eight-year term. This feature implies the participation, albeit not complete, of citizens in the elections of not only the president, the head of the civil administration, but also the Supreme Leader of the state. The Council of Experts performs the function of a “voter qualification”, in many ways similar to that which the Founding Fathers of the United States invested in the Electoral College.
According to Art. 111 of the main document, the Council of Experts is entrusted with another significant responsibility for monitoring the activities and condition of the Supreme Leader, as well as the right to remove the elected Rahbar from office in a number of expressly provided cases: incapacity due to physical health, failure to meet the criteria put forward for a candidate at the time of the elections, or after them. The fact that this function is not formal is evidenced by the creation of a permanent specialised commission that meets monthly. Its functions include monitoring the condition of the Rahbar and preparing a report on his activities for the expanded composition of the Council. If certain problems are identified in the performance of the Supreme Leader’s duties, the members of the commission are obliged to hold a meeting with the Rahbar and provide him with recommendations for improving his activities. Every year, based on the observations of the commission, the Council of Experts makes a decision on the suitability of the current Rahbar for the position he holds.
The exclusive right to interpret the Constitution of Iran, as a document that enshrines the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic, requires the existence of a specialised body, the Supervisory Council. A council of 12 members is formed, 6 of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader and are faqihs, the remaining 6 are nominated by the head of the judiciary, approved by parliament, and they are recognised experts in various fields of law. This institution is not advisory in nature, it has its own competencies in the field of control over the legislative and executive branches of government, which makes it the most significant institution after the Supreme Leader himself. The main document clearly assigns to the Council the responsibility to check the compliance of all initiatives of the Majlis with the norms of Sharia and the spirit of the constitution; in the event of discrepancies, the council can veto the bill and send it back for revision. The Supervisory Council is entrusted with the functions of a single body to control the elections of the president and parliament; candidates can be admitted to the electoral processes only after the approval by the council. The actual concentration of supervisory and censorship powers, indirect control over the electoral system and placing the legislative process in the hands of an appointed authority bound only by the norms of the constitution and Sharia makes it possible to hold open democratic elections for civil positions in a theocratic country, despite the existence of certain barriers.
The Expediency Council is a kind of coordinating body directly mentioned in the Constitution of Iran. Its original purpose was to eliminate disagreements between the parliament and the Supervisory Council, in the event of the latter repeatedly using the right of veto in the legislative process. One of the most important duties of the Expediency Council is to consult the Supreme Leader on the policies he pursues. According to Article 110 of the Constitution, “determining the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, after consultations with the Expediency Council, is the responsibility of the Supreme Leader. Given that many members of the Council are ex-officio, being representatives of the civil administration, the Supreme Leader’s obligation to consult with them to one degree or another “limits” his power. It is also important that representatives of different political movements are members of this body, which also creates space for discussion and lobbying of the interests of their groups.
All the above-mentioned institutions exist not only on paper, but in practice perform the functions assigned to them, and are the key to the stability of the entire system of power. The presence of a wide range of political movements is a conflict-generating factor in Iran’s domestic politics. The most significant catalyst for inter-elite clashes are the all-Iranian elections, when representatives of different movements have the opportunity to directly influence the political future of the country.
The unrest after the Iranian presidential elections in 2009 became a serious test of strength. Mass riots and protests by the losers were unable to unbalance the election control structure. It was the Supervisory Council, as a coordinating control body, that recounted the votes at certain polling stations and then confirmed the legitimacy of the elected president, thereby resolving the flaring internal conflict with unpredictable consequences.
Despite the external dualism of the country’s political structure, the supra-governmental bodies allow for finding a stable balance between the interests of the individual and the state. Each of them essentially carries out the functions of a “guardian” in relation to the civil institutions under their jurisdiction. The presence of electoral procedures creates an indirect opportunity for the implementation of their electoral rights for adherents of all viewpoints in Iranian politics, pre-emptively levelling possible discontent of the population associated with the presence of a strictly regulated religious ideology.