Multipolarity and Connectivity
Modi’s Kiev Visit a Dent in India’s Strategic Autonomy?

India is firm about its policy of safeguarding its national interests. History testifies that in Europe, all the military conflicts are ultimately resolved through negotiated settlement. India is of the opinion that a new world order will emerge after the end of the conflict in Ukraine someday sooner or later, with new security architecture ensuring equal security for big and small nations, Vinay Shukla writes.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “historic” visit to Kiev on August 23, 2024 – the first since the establishment of diplomatic relations with independent Ukraine in 1992 in the wake of the Soviet collapse, has generally been welcomed by the US-led West and its allies. However, his visit and talks with Ukrainian President Zelensky have left the impression that Modi undertook his nine-hour-long Kiev tour under pressure from the US to balance out his July visit to Moscow, where he had talks with President Vladimir Putin, to prove his neutrality.

In his statement in Kiev, Modi again declared that this was not the era of war and added that India is “not neutral” in the Ukraine conflict, it was in “favour of peace”. But after the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s August 6 incursion in Russia’s Kursk region with the help of Western arms, mercenaries and advisors, things had changed and by visiting Kiev against this backdrop, Modi virtually condoned Zelensky’s escalation and dented India’s coveted strategic autonomy. Nevertheless, the timing of the visit does reflect that while planning it, Indian officials have kept in mind the sharp reactions from the US to Modi's Moscow visit.

However, experts who are aware of the genesis of the conflict believe that the Ukraine crisis was the ultimate result of the US-engineered regime change in Kiev in 2014 and the key for resolving it is to be found with Washington and its European allies. It's an open secret that US-led NATO wants a regime change in the Kremlin and Zelensky’s Ukraine is a pawn in the game against “Putin’s assertive Russia”. Modi in his third term is much weaker, as his BJP party has failed to garner a clear majority on its own. Due to the whims and demands of his alliance partners and consolidated opposition led by the Indian National Congress’ young leader Rahul Gandhi, he is forced to keep the parliamentary balance.

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third term balances continuity and change in India's foreign policy, emphasising strategic autonomy, regional stability, and deeper engagement with the Global South. His “Neighbourhood First” policy, complex relations with China and Pakistan, and strengthened ties with Russia underscore India's commitment to a multipolar vision and a significant role in global governance, writes Rupal Mishra. The author is a participant of the Valdai - New Generation project.
Opinions


Shashi Tharoor, a senior leader of the opposition Indian National Congress and a member of parliament, ahead of Modi's visit to Ukraine said it was a “good gesture and will be appreciated”.

“I think that many felt that India has been playing an even-handed role in most of the conflicts in the world today and that it could be good to show a certain amount of concern for both sides as visibly as he did in Moscow, and going and greeting President Zelensky amidst all the rubble of that country will be a very fine gesture,” Tharoor, a former Minister of State for External Affairs told PTI news agency.

No serious expert of international relations in India, including Tharoor, believes India can play any role in bringing peace, aside from Modi’s personal willingness to do his part to facilitate dialogue and diplomacy.

Some believe Modi’s visit was significant because Kiev and some Western countries had reacted sharply to his July visit to Moscow and now New Delhi wants to placate the West.

It’s not surprising to see India balance its relations between two rival camps competing in battleground Ukraine. It is more about signalling that while India will continue to have strong relations with Russia, it will still work closely with the West.

In an interview to BBC, Michael Kugelman, a US-based expert, opined that the trip will further reassert India’s strategic autonomy.

“India isn’t in the business of placating Western powers, or anyone for that matter. It’s a trip meant to advance Indian interests, by reasserting friendship with Kiev and conveying its concerns about the continuing war,” he said.

India has refrained from directly criticising Russia over the war, much to the annoyance of Western powers.

The West has created a myth that Modi can stop war in Ukraine by pressuring Putin to do so. “Stop buying Russian oil, and Putin will have no money to finance it,” Zelensky told Indian media. But he ignored the fact that his regime’s benefactors, the European nations, are continuing to buy natural gas worth billions of euros from Russia.

India is firm about its policy of safeguarding its national interests. History testifies that in Europe, all the military conflicts are ultimately resolved through negotiated settlement. India is of the opinion that a new world order will emerge after the end of the conflict in Ukraine someday sooner or later, with new security architecture ensuring equal security for big and small nations and New Delhi would prefer to be at the high table of stakeholders and only strategic autonomy can ensure this. 

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Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.