For a long time, Turkey’s military industry has been critically dependent on Western financing, institutions and technology, the fragmentary manifestations and consequences of which persist today. However, during the AKP period, the Turkish military-industrial complex has gone through two main stages of development: eliminating external dependence and developing the country’s internal potential and introducing a high-tech component of the military-industrial complex and entering the international market, writes Nubara Kulieva, a participant in the Valdai – New Generation project..
The militarisation of Turkey’s foreign policy during Justice and Development Party rule has been accompanied by the weakening of the role of the Armed Forces and military institutions in the domestic political system. The approach to the use of military force in Turkey’s foreign policy has become more complex, and at the same time its importance and possible options have increased.
From the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the mid-2000s, the army had been an effective tool for influencing both domestic and foreign policy decision-making. It determined the ability of a particular political force to consolidate power in the country and was one of the main obstacles to pro-Islamic parties and movements gaining legal influence. Moreover, the military was a guarantor of political stability in the country, and directly intervened in the political processes more than once (in 1960, 1971 and 1980).
During the AKP’s tenure ruling Turkey, the army’s functioning as a political institution has changed. Until the early 2000s, the army was primarily an instrument for stabilising and regulating domestic politics. The foreign policy dimension of its activities was limited to involvement in multilateral formats (military coalitions, NATO and UN peacekeeping missions). Since the mid-2000s, the army has primarily played the role of an instrument to form an autonomous foreign policy model in accordance with national rather than collective interests. The nature of its activities has changed, with a transition from risk management and reactive measures within Turkey to a strategy of using the military in a preventive way outside the nation’s borders.
However, the process of dismantling the institutions of military influence within the political system has not weakened the Turkish army in terms of its combat effectiveness. On the contrary, it has been accompanied by a strengthening of the army as an effective foreign policy instrument, given the already high potential of the Turkish Armed Forces as the second-most-powerful among the NATO members. Turkey’s military spending as of 2024 was a record 1 trillion 133 billion Turkish lira, which at the time of the budget’s approval was equal to more than $40 billion.
This is about 8.8% of the country’s budget and indicates an increase of over 150% compared to the 2023 budget.
For a long time, Turkey’s military industry has been critically dependent on Western financing, institutions and technology, the fragmentary manifestations and consequences of which persist today. The process of reducing the importance of the external component in the formation of the country’s military potential began after the “Peacekeeping Operation in Cyprus” in 1974, which led to the introduction of an arms embargo by the United States. However, during the AKP period, the Turkish military-industrial complex has gone through two main stages of development: 1) eliminating external dependence and developing the country’s internal potential and 2) introducing a high-tech component of the military-industrial complex and entering the international market. As of 2023, the share of the national component in the Turkish military-industrial complex was 80%, and by 2028 this indicator is expected to increase to 85%, while as of 2002, the AKP mentioned only 25%. Anyway, one cannot talk about the complete autonomy of the Turkish military-industrial complex, since the achieved successes affect only some strategically important industries. In other cases, reliance on cooperation with NATO countries and a focus on imports remains.
According to SIPRI, Turkey ranked 11th among the world’s 25 largest suppliers of major conventional weapons in 2019–2023. Turkey’s defence and aerospace exports reached a record $5.5 billion in 2023, up 27% from 2022. The main destination for Turkish arms exports is the MENA region, along with a growing share of African countries, and the top three recipients are the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Pakistan.
In recent years, Turkey has been focusing on the development of unmanned aerial systems, especially in the segment of medium and tactical combat drones. Turkish UAVs, primarily the ANKA and Bayraktar TB-2, have proven their effectiveness in the region in Syria and Libya, which has attracted the attention of a wide range of countries to their supplies. Regional actors such as Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco and Saudi Arabia already have between one and several dozen Turkish drones.
However, in reality, the goals proclaimed in the context of the development of the military-industrial complex often face a discrepancy between the country’s economic and technological base for achieving them.
Military force has been the main foreign policy instrument of Turkey; it has been used in Libya after 2019. At the initial stages of the conflict, this was expressed in supporting the forces of the international coalition, as well as targeted military-technical cooperation. Today, this appears to be an independent policy of Turkey to provide military assistance and carry out military operations on the territory of Libya. Properly with Turkish military assistance the Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli was stopped in 2019, and Turkey confirmed the effectiveness of the military involvement model in regional conflicts developed since the beginning of the “Arab Spring”, including the use of various kinds of military instruments (formal/informal, traditional/non-traditional, etc.).
The distinctive features of this which set it aside from the classic use of “hard power” after the “Arab Spring” (as, for example, in the case of Syria) are, first, the legal status of military activity. The most active and significant phase of Turkish military involvement in Libya was implemented after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Security and Military Cooperation between the GNA and Turkey in 2019. The Turkish military contingent (initially about 1,000 Turkish military personnel and experts) was sent to Libya in response to an official request from the Government of National Accord. The conclusion of further agreements contributed to the extraordinary expansion of powers of the Turkish contingent in Libya (the presence of Turkish troops only within the jurisdiction of Turkish law, the possibility of free entry into Libyan air and sea space, the carrying of weapons and the inspection of citizens and vehicles outside the area of deployment, etc).
Second, an important distinctive feature of Turkey’s military activity in Libya is the hybrid nature of the military force use. Despite the presence of elements of traditional military operations abroad (such as the deployment of a military contingent and military supplies), the main emphasis in Libya was on providing advisory and training, logistic support to the GNA, as well as the use of high-tech military potential (primarily UAVs) and the involvement of foreign mercenaries. The combination of the direct and indirect use of military force through the demonstration and sale of military potential has given Turkey the opportunity to effectively exchange its military potential for privileges in the use of shelf resources in the Mediterranean. Thus, the involvement of the Turkish military force in Libya can be regarded as an important element in the use of “smart power”.
The Libyan experience has reinforced the success of the latest Turkish military developments, given that Libya actively used Turkish-made weapons (including Bayraktar TB2 drones, Kirpi armoured vehicles, etc.). This has significantly increased the prestige of the Turkish military-industrial complex in the international arena. In addition, Turkey has de facto acquired another physical foothold in the region in the form of the Al-Watiya air base, the trilateral military coordination centre in the port of Misrata, and the naval base in Homs. Turkey’s position “on the ground” in Libya provides Ankara with a channel for expanding its de facto involvement in the region, for example, the air force could potentially conduct operations in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and Chad.
