If now the situation calms down again, then this means that India’s move to raise the stakes has worked, and the violation of the enemy’s red lines does not lead to a threatening response on its part. If the conflict escalates, we will observe and evaluate how acceptable is for India to pursue a full-scale military solution to a problem that cannot be resolved politically, Oleg Barabanov writes.
During the night of May 6-7, 2025, India announced the launch of Operation Sindoor in response to the terrorist attack on tourists in Indian-held Kashmir. Artillery and missile strikes were carried out deep inside Pakistani territory, not only in Pakistan-held Kashmir, but also in Punjab. New Delhi stated that all strikes were carried out on terrorist training bases, and that no Pakistani military facilities were hit. The Pakistani side, in turn, emphasized that the strikes hit civilian facilities and a mosque.
Then, throughout the night, Pakistan carried out retaliatory air strikes. Both sides, as in the previous conflict in 2019, claimed that they had shot down many enemy aircraft. By the morning of May 7, the intensity of the direct military strikes seemed to have died down and come to naught. But the situation remains extremely dynamic and explosive. The media and information war between the two countries, which has naturally accompanied the military activity, also remains heated and uncompromising.
In assessing the previous periods of escalation of the Indian-Pakistani conflict after both countries conducted their nuclear tests in the second half of the 1990s, it can be noted that a kind of unwritten code of conduct has developed between the two opponents, which put up barriers to the uncontrolled escalation of the conflict and its possible escalation into a nuclear war. This was the case in 1999 during the Kargil conflict, in 2001-2002 after the terrorist attack in Delhi, and in 2019 after the terrorist attack in Pulwama. Escalation in the last two cases, as now, began with a terrorist attack on Indian territory.
In all the aforementioned cases, the escalation of the conflict did not lead to full-scale military action at the operational-strategic level along the entire Indian-Pakistani border, and they all died down relatively quickly. Moreover, comparing these conflicts with each other, one can see an increasing softening of the reaction. During the escalation of 2001-2002, India at least carried out a significant massing and mobilisation of troops and forces on the Pakistani border during Operation Parakram. Thus, at least, it demonstrated readiness for a full-scale invasion. In 2019, there was none of that. The parties exchanged airstrikes. In the media, both sides victoriously declared that many enemy aircraft had been shot down. This once again brings to mind the already relevant proverb that nowhere do people lie as much as during hunting, fishing and war. Then, several days later, Pakistan returned to India the captured pilot of what was apparently the only plane shot down by either side. This pilot, a loser who failed his combat mission, immediately became a media hero in India (another transformation in the media perception of the war now). And everything calmed down again.
Thus, the 2019 escalation is a kind of model example of an Indo-Pakistani conflict with nuclear weapons in both countries. A terrorist attack, then minor military strikes, then a violent media war before the sides calm down. At least, this was the case until 2025. But now, it seems, the situation is changing.
At the moment, the course of events during the current round of escalation of the Indian-Pakistani conflict after the terrorist attack against tourists in Kashmir has already overcome several unwritten “red lines” that had served as a barrier to uncontrolled escalation earlier. The first is the suspension of the water distribution agreement by India. According to it, as is known, the water resources of some rivers flowing from India to Pakistani Punjab belong to India, and some to Pakistan. Of those rivers, the water which belongs to India is actively used by the Indian side for its economic needs, as a result of which these rivers enter Pakistan with very low water, and sometimes dry up. The situation is different with the same rivers, the water of which, according to the agreement, belongs to Pakistan. Although the Pakistani side periodically accused India of stealing water from rivers intended for Pakistan, this problem generally has never reached a critical level. Now that India has suspended the agreement and the information about the dams is closed, this problem has reached a qualitatively new level. It is something that has not happened before, at least after the nuclear tests of both countries in the second half of the 1990s. In the context of Pakistani Punjab’s critical dependence on river water resources for agricultural and domestic needs, and the threat of drought, the blocking of dams could become a very significant trigger for escalation.
The second thing, which also probably has not happened in the wake of the nuclear tests of the two countries, is artillery and rocket attacks deep into Pakistani territory, not only in Kashmir, but also in Punjab. What India did during Operation Sindoor on the night of May 6-7.
All this allows us to ask the question of whether the barriers that prevented the uncontrolled escalation of the conflict between the two nuclear powers can be deliberately destroyed. Both sides tried not to cross after both openly tested nuclear weapons. And are these barriers now suffering the same fate as all those rhetorical “red lines” in the current Ukrainian conflict? They were first declared and then violated one after another, which, as a rule, caused only a media response. At the same time, realistic scenarios for the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict into a large direct military clash between Russia and the West (with a possible nuclear factor), at least at the moment, are not visible. Does this mean that India can now, in its response to the terrorist attack, use this experience of the Ukrainian conflict as an example? Is Russia now perceived in India as an example? Is it seen as possible to pursue a full-scale military solution to a problem if it cannot be resolved politically? On the other hand, is Ukraine not an example for India? That it is possible to freely violate the enemy’s “red lines” without leading to a significant increase in the level of escalation and threat? In addition, if we recall another current conflict, is Israel not an example for India? That it is possible to respond to a terrorist attack not with a pinpoint strike, but with a full-scale conflict, If there is no other solution to the problem of terrorist attacks?
If now, after Operation Sindoor on the night of May 6-7, the situation calms down again, then this means that India’s move to raise the stakes has worked, and the violation of the enemy’s red lines does not lead to a threatening response on its part. If the conflict escalates, we will observe and evaluate how acceptable is for India to pursue a full-scale military solution to a problem that cannot be resolved politically. However, there is one nuance that distinguishes this conflict from the other two mentioned above. If Pakistan lacks operational depth in the event of full-scale military activity along the entire border, India’s successes (in combination with an eventual naval blockade of the port of Karachi), according to all the rules of military science, may leave Pakistan no choice but to use nuclear weapons. Or will this red line also become rhetorical, as in other conflicts?
