Until recently, Russian-North Korean relations were regulated by the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation of 2000, as well as the Pyongyang and Moscow Declarations of 2000 and 2001, signed at the highest level, which the DPRK side considered even more important.
Honestly, it must be said that the parties were not scrupulous in their implementation: Russia joined in implementing the unprecedentedly harsh sanctions against the DPRK, used rather harsh wording regarding the DPRK's nuclear missile programme, and the North Koreans were in no hurry to consult with Russia on issues that were important to it, as stipulated in the documents.
However, the unprecedented rise in relations that began in 2023 against the backdrop of the DPRK's support for Russia’s military efforts in Ukraine warranted non-standard steps. One of them was the signing of a defence pact, unusual for the current era, which puts the Russia-DPRK alliance on a key role in world politics. Moreover, unlike many other treaties, this one was considered authoritative even before it technically came into force (December 4, 2024).
The signing of the Treaty on Mutual Military Assistance made a shocking impression. Some of our enemies in Europe and others, including the ill-fated South Korean President Yoon (whose paranoia about the “North Korean threat” helped motivate his failed military coup), declared the Russia-North Korea treaty “a direct existential threat to world peace”. Yoon decided to “punish” Moscow by introducing new sanctions and threatening to start direct arms supplies to Ukraine. (G. Toloraya. How to overcome the crisis in relations with the Republic of Korea - Russia in Global Affairs, 2.7.2024) The West believes that the new quality of relations with Russia would allow the DPRK to “be bolder” and behave “more aggressively”.
What are the opponents of the DPRK afraid of? First of all, the DPRK will receive modern defence technology and equipment from Russia in exchange for the supply of ammunition. In addition, its troops will acquire real combat experience.
Meanwhile, in the treaty itself, the parties stated their commitment to the goals and principles of the UN Charter, as well as other generally recognised principles and norms of international law. It also provides for consultation mechanisms and legal procedures that do not allow for automatism in resolving issues of war and peace. Article 4 itself, which caused real hysteria in a number of countries, practically repeats similar articles of the American-South Korean and North Korean-Chinese treaties.
Nor did our explanations help that “if no one is going to attack the DPRK, then, accordingly, there is no need to invoke the provisions of this article.”
However, in reality, it turned out that the provisions of this article may be applicable not to the hypothetical case of an attack on the DPRK, when Russia would have to provide assistance, but in the opposite situation. The Ukrainian invasion of Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024 is exactly the case where this article may be invoked if the DPRK, in accordance with its legislation, decides to provide Russia with support. However, this has not been done yet. No requests from Russia or responses from the DPRK have been recorded. There are no DPRK military units in Russia; even if you believe the rumours about the presence of North Korean soldiers, no one has seen them in DPRK combat uniforms. Joint exercises or parades with their participation, even in an official capacity (which has been discussed) are not prohibited by any UN resolutions, if they do not receive income or undergo military training.
Along with the obligations to support each other in the UN and other international organisations, the intention to create “mechanisms for conducting joint activities to strengthen defence capability in the interests of preventing war and ensuring regional and international peace and security” looks very significant, hinting at the possibility of participating in collective security systems. Russian representatives insist that the treaty “will make a positive contribution to maintaining the balance of power in the region based on the principle of indivisibility of security, reducing the risk of a relapse into war on the Korean Peninsula, including with the use of nuclear weapons, and, in general, lays the foundation for building a new Eurasian security system.” It is not directed against third countries, it is intended to reduce the risks of escalation on the Korean Peninsula, including nuclear escalation, but does not contain any secret clauses.
One can imagine the participation of the parties to the treaty engaging in joint diplomatic activity, especially since Russia has always remained a champion of a multilateral format for diplomatic settlement on the Korean Peninsula, taking into account the legitimate interests of all parties involved.
In the context of the confrontation between the DPRK and the ROK against the backdrop of the formation of the USA-Japan-South Korea military-political triangle, the endless anti-North Korean exercises in and around South Korea, as well as the unpredictable political situation in the ROK itself, which at the end of 2024 faces an unprecedented political crisis, it is worth thinking about proactive actions in this regard. For example, such an opportunity may be provided if a new American-Korean policy is created “from scratch”. Despite the growing confrontation with the United States, which has already acquired a military dimension in some locations, Moscow should look for opportunities to avoid aggravating confrontation where it is disadvantageous to either side. The Korean problem is one such case.
The main place in the treaty is occupied by articles of a “framework” nature, the parties “actively encourage joint research in the field of science and technology, including such areas as space, biology, peaceful nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, information technology and others.” To overcome the narrowness of the economic interaction base, it would be possible to initiate some large-scale, symbolic long-term project - such as the construction of a nuclear power plant in the DPRK as a Russian project (Problems and Possibilities of Modernising North Korean Energy with Russia's Participation. Moscow, IE RAS, 2008. p. 11) in accordance with the agreement signed between the USSR and the DPRK in 1985, which remains in effect.
After the collapse of the USSR, work was curtailed. The creation of nuclear power capacities is recognised by experts as the only long-term solution to the energy problem in the DPRK (there are more than 30 nuclear power plants in South Korea).
Today, as a result of the growth of trade, especially Korean exports, funds for this can be found, including loans. The construction of a nuclear power plant, as well as the accompanying modernisation of the power grid, would be extremely important for the economy of the DPRK, beneficial for the Russian nuclear industry, and would form the basis for long-term strategic cooperation. Given the humanitarian dimension and peaceful nature of the programme, there are various ways to implement this in the context of UN sanctions. In particular, if such projects are considered to have a humanitarian focus, they fall under the corresponding exemptions from the sanctions regime.
