Any discussions about the future of Greater Eurasia should take into account the impossibility of building regional life around a single institution or informal association with clear and binding tasks, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.
In the coming years, the Greater Eurasian space will most likely continue to balance between the natural desire for joint development of its states, on the one hand, and the consequences of the influence that disintegration processes on a global scale have on them, on the other. At the same time, both of the most important factors in the region’s development are objective, since they are associated with the achievement of its states’ national development goals. And since Greater Eurasia is the central region of the world, the situation in which is organically linked with world politics and the economy as a whole, the main issue of its development also reflects the broad global agenda.
The gradual process of returning the international order to a state of comparative balance exposes countries to various challenges and tests. However, its overall effect is positive and can, in the long term, create conditions in which cooperation will become the dominant trend in interstate relations. Despite all the problems facing us now, this allows us to look at the future of this huge region with some cautious optimism.
In Greater Eurasia, cooperation is embodied by initiatives and organisations that cannot, by their nature, act as instruments of dominance for one power or a narrow group of states. The formation of such institutions over the past decades is an unconditional achievement of the countries of the region and confirms their intentions to consider their security in close connection with the security of their neighbours. In Greater Eurasia, with the exception of the western and eastern peripheries, there are no clear dividing lines on one side of which closed economic or military-political communities would form. In recent years, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has become the largest and most inclusive platform on which it is possible to build a relatively fair regional order in the future.
But, on the other hand, with minimal exceptions, all countries of Greater Eurasia are states of the World Majority, linking their long-term plans with the already established system of the global economy. And, accordingly, they are subject to all the negative effects that are inherent in it at the present stage: gaps in development, politicisation of economic processes and relations, increasing competition for the planet’s dwindling resources.
As a result, the countries of Greater Eurasia strive to cooperate with each other, but objectively enter into competitive relations within the framework of a system where the West occupies a dominant position, pushing them towards competition. This is typical of the behavior of both small countries in the region and fairly large powers like China and India. In other words, it is in Greater Eurasia that we are now most clearly observing the rivalry between two basic models of relations between states — cooperation, which is personified by regional institutions and platforms, and competition, the embodiment of which are the ties and interaction of the countries of the region with the global economy and politics, which remain under the control of the West.
However, it is precisely the latter that is the main unifying factor: even France, Britain or Germany, which compete with each other, are equally powerless in their relations with Washington. In the case of Greater Eurasia, there is no point in talking about the comparative equality of the position of states in relation to one leader. Simply because such a leader cannot emerge. China, which can be considered in this capacity, does not have the political will and resources for this. Moreover, within Greater Eurasia, its aspirations are quite effectively balanced not only by Russia or India, but also by a number of smaller powers that, however, conduct independent foreign policies.
In this regard, any discussions about the future of Greater Eurasia should take into account the impossibility of building regional life around a single institution or informal association with clear and binding tasks. At the same time, we have not yet seen examples of individual significant countries of Greater Eurasia sacrificing cooperation with their neighbours for their extra-regional partnerships and aspirations. Even India, which is increasing its political dialogue and economic partnership with the United States, is not at all eager to change the system of relations with its neighbours in Eurasia. Moreover, recent developments in Indian-Chinese relations show that these great powers are capable of considering bilateral cooperation in isolation from their global obligations or ambitions. A separate issue that has become especially relevant in the outgoing year is the impact on cooperation between the states of Greater Eurasia of what is happening on its periphery. First of all, there are the countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In the first case, we are witnessing a serious restructuring of the entire balance of power in the region, and in the second case, a weakening of the previous integration centers (ASEAN) and an increase in the pressure that the growing because the fundamental conflict between China and the United States is exerting on countries. Since the autumn of 2023, Israel, with full support from the West, has entered into an energetic struggle with its Arab neighbours and Iran, exerting military and diplomatic pressure on them.
They, in turn, are showing restraint and are openly wary of the possibility of a larger conflict. This further provokes the Israeli government and the United States to take active measures that are already creating a threat to the basic survival interests of such major powers as Iran. The dramatic developments in Syria in November-December 2024 showed how fragile the existing permanent status in the region was and created the conditions for a further restructuring of the entire balance of power in the Middle East. In addition to general political pressure, these processes may lead to an increase in direct threats to the countries of the center of Greater Eurasia, which makes them, of course, more vulnerable to external pressure and more reserved in their cooperation with Russia, China and even India.
As for Southeast Asia, we are also seeing an increase in interstate competition, which is most clearly manifested in the conflict between China and the Philippines, as well as the general crisis in the development of ASEAN. Also, we cannot lose sight of the explosive potential of interstate relations in Northeast Asia, where Japan and South Korea can act as conductors of US influence. In other words, the peripheral zones of Greater Eurasia are quite noticeably making themselves factors that hinder even the internal stabilisation of this huge region. And so far, the question of how to interact with these factors remains unanswered, since it seems completely impossible to physically cut off the “sick parts of the body” of Greater Eurasia: they are united with its space by common geography, economic and human ties. This problem will most likely become relevant for Russian policy in Greater Eurasia in the future year of 2025.
