In recent weeks, much attention in the media has been paid to proposals to change France's nuclear weapons policy. Since early March, French President Macron and representatives of his government have made a number of loud statements about expanding its role, which have caused a debate in Europe and been noticed in Russia. It would be a good idea to take a closer look at them and see what the prospects are for “opening the French nuclear umbrella over the EU.”
Like many other things in world politics these days, these latest discussions were prompted by the activity of Donald Trump. His efforts to establish American-Russian dialogue, and his emphatically independent and deliberately inconsistent policy towards his allies have led to debates about whether Europe can rely on the United States with respect to security. This includes the American “nuclear umbrella” - the US commitment to “extended nuclear deterrence,” that is, the readiness to respond with its nuclear arsenal to a nuclear attack on allies. It cannot be considered as a completely new topic - the question “Is the US ready to sacrifice Boston for Bonn?” was one of the central ones during the Cold War in Europe.
Now the situation has been aggravated by the odious image of the American leader and the gradual understanding by European politicians that Trump is not an accident, not an anomaly, but a new image of at least a significant part of America. It will not be possible to simply “sit him out,” because new “Trumps” may come after him. Naturally, this is compounded by the Ukraine crisis, which from a security point of view is perceived in many European countries as confirmation of the real “Russian threat”.
The most realistic “foundation” for pan-European nuclear deterrence can be French nuclear forces. Great Britain, despite actively participating in current pan-European discussions of security issues, left the EU and in the long-term is too tied to the United States. This is especially true In matters of nuclear weapons: the only ones it still has operational are American Trident II submarine-launched missiles. They are literally American - by agreement, the British have a quota in the Atlantic missile arsenal of the US Navy, and British missile carriers go for reloading across the Atlantic, to Kings Bay base in Georgia (warheads of British manufacture are loaded onto the missiles when they return home. In addition, submarines are not very suitable for demonstrative actions or demonstrative forward deployment, so if European nuclear forces are created as a political instrument, then the “British foundation” is weak.
A number of European countries can be considered threshold - for example, Germany and Sweden, but making a decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and start a sovereign nuclear program would require a level of political will from them that is difficult to expect from European politicians now.
What does France have today?
According to statements by French leaders and expert assessments, the Fifth Republic's nuclear arsenal has almost three hundred thermonuclear warheads, nearly all of which can be considered operationally deployed. With the decommissioning of ballistic missiles with single-warheads (land and sea) of the megaton class, all French warheads are of fairly moderate power - perhaps about 100 kilotons on submarine missiles, and about 300 kilotons on aircraft missiles. In order to obtain information for the development of these modern devices, France conducted nuclear tests until 1996, despite the condemnation of the world community. Although the production of highly enriched uranium, plutonium and tritium has ceased, it was said that sufficient reserves had been accumulated to meet the needs of the arsenal for the foreseeable future. Given the long service life of nuclear warheads and their suitability for “reprocessing”, this could become a problem only in the event of plans for a significant increase in the arsenal.
Nuclear weapons carriers in France include:
- four Triomphant-class nuclear submarines, each with 16 M51 ballistic missiles
- the M51 ballistic missile is equipped with a multiple warheads, up to six warheads can be installed. At the moment, the main modification is the M51.2 with a range in light equipment up to 8-9 thousand km. In the near future, the deployment of the M51.3 modification with an improved missile defence penetration system and accuracy is expected.
- two-seat multi-role Rafale B fighters, land-based and single-seat Rafale M carriers, which can carry one supersonic ASMPA cruise missile
- the ASMPA cruise missile has a range of up to 600 km, and a maximum speed of up to three times the speed of sound at high altitude (at low altitude, probably about two). A modernisation program is underway, called ASMPA-R, to extend the weapon’s service life.
There are three submarine missile payloads in service - 48, and probably several spare missiles, taking into account periodic test and qualification launches. One of the submarines is constantly on combat patrol, one is in long-term repair (as a result, it does not need ammunition), of the remaining, one is usually at sea for personnel training or equipment checks after repairs. There are about 50 ASMPA missiles (taking into account the testing cost) and probably no more than 40 warheads for them. Although, if equipped with special suspension units, they can probably be used by any two-seater land-based fighter and any of the carrier-based (France is probably the only country in the world to retain nuclear weapons for carrier-based aircraft), only two Air Force squadrons undergo special training: 1/4 "Gascogne" and 2/4 "LaFayette". Both are normally based at the Saint-Dizier air base, along with some naval pilots. In addition to Saint-Dizier, ASMPA missiles are stored at the Istres and Avord air bases to ensure the rapid dispersal of forces. To ensure long-range strikes, there is an attached fleet of tanker aircraft with which training is regularly conducted.
Words and deeds
As noted at the beginning, Macron's latest statements have attracted considerable attention. However, his statements - including in this area - should be treated with caution. It often turns out that his latest “bold initiative” is no longer new. Thus, at the beginning of March this year, he announced that “at the historic request of the future German chancellor, he is opening a strategic debate on the issue of protecting our allies with strategic deterrence”, as if forgetting that he said something similar in April last year. The speech during the visit to the Luxeuil-Saint-Sauveur air base on March 18 made headlines - “France will deploy nuclear weapons on the border with Germany” was their general meaning. To be precise, it is planned that by the mid-2030s, two squadrons of the Rafale F5 version currently under development with advanced hypersonic ASN4G nuclear missiles will be deployed at this air base. However, plans to return Luxeuil-Saint-Sauveur to "nuclear status" (fighters with nuclear missiles were deployed there until 2011, the storage facility operated for several more years) have been known for a year now.
Even before the Ukraine crisis, France launched a number of programmes to develop new nuclear weapons carriers - first of all, the aforementioned ASN4G aircraft missile is being created to replace the ASMPA and the construction of the first of a series of promising missile submarines under the SNLE 3G program has begun, with a plan to put them into service after 2035. Also, apparently, a gliding hypersonic warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles is being developed - an analogue of the Russian Avangard. “Keeping in mind” nuclear missions, a deeply modernised Rafale F5 is being developed, which will have to operate in conjunction with an “unmanned wingman” drone. In the more distant future (2040s), the French insist that a Franco-German-Spanish sixth-generation fighter, created under the FGFA program, should also be able to use ASN4G.
Such programmes cannot be radically accelerated - in the current situation, one can only expect that they will receive sufficient funding to reduce the likelihood of shifts in implementation deadlines “to the right”. What could the French authorities do in the coming years, other than repeating rather empty statements? Since the issue of extended deterrence is largely political and declarative, first of all, adjustments can be made to the French and pan-European doctrinal documents (in particular, to Article 42 of the EU Treaty). Demonstrative measures could include practicing the deployment of fighters from “nuclear” squadrons at the air bases of allied countries and joint exercises (analogous to NATO’s “Steadfast Noon” exercises). In the event of the further deterioration of the military-political situation, it is possible to deploy missile-loaded “Rafale” jets at allied bases, but this will require investments in infrastructure and significant political will. It is easier to join the demonstrative actions of the fleet - for example, periodic demonstrative calls to the ports of allies of French missile submarines (similar to the practice introduced by the USA in South Korea). An exchange of visits of missile carriers has already been practiced several times by France and Great Britain.
Of the military-technical measures, in addition to the difficult-to-accelerate aforementioned programs, in the medium term it is possible, like Great Britain, to slightly increase the number of charges deployed on submarines for “strengthening deterrence.” Perhaps there is an opportunity to launch a small number of additional ASMPA missiles. A more serious and effective step would be to create a nuclear charge MdCN sea-based cruise missiles, which would make it possible to use the multi-purpose submarines of the "Barracuda" type for nuclear strikes. Considering that it is planned, within the framework of the LCM programme, to create a land-based medium-range missile complex with MdCN, the European authorities will be able to repeat the "Euromissile crisis" of the 1980s without resorting to the help of the United States - of course, if they set themselves such a goal. Perhaps, it is precisely clear goal-setting, ability and determination to achieve what is planned that is the most scarce resource in military-strategic planning in Europe today. On the other hand, if they do not implement all the ideas expressed, then the security of the continent will probably only benefit from this.
