At the beginning of each publication on Eurasian security, it is inevitably written that this term was first heard in the speeches of Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2024 — first in his address to the Federal Assembly, and then at a meeting with the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Gradually, this concept is acquiring some content, and the process of its formation is in full swing. But if at the global level the implementation of Eurasian security is increasingly taking on certain outlines, then at the regional level there are still a number of questions that have yet to be answered. The Balkans have traditionally been one of the most difficult regions with regards to security, and perhaps the Eurasian alternative could untie many of the Gordian knots there. In this article, we will try to define the possible contours of the implementation of the Eurasian security approach in the Balkans.
Eurasian Security: Signifier vs. Signified
In February 2024, in his (last to date) address to the Federal Assembly, the Russian president stated the need to form a "new contour of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia". Three months later, at a meeting with the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Putin revealed a little more detail regarding his vision of the concept: equal and indivisible security was supplemented with "mutually beneficial, equal cooperation and development". The new variation of security should, according to the president, be based on the following principles: “dialogue with all potential participants in the future security system,” openness of the “future security architecture for all Eurasian countries” (he then clarified that for “both European and NATO countries”), activation of the “dialogue process between multilateral organisations already operating in Eurasia,” the beginning of a “broad discussion of a new system of bilateral and multilateral guarantees of collective security in Eurasia,” as well as “issues of the economy, social well-being, integration and mutually beneficial cooperation” and the solution of many problems as part of the “Eurasian system of security and development”.
The president then outlined the need to develop a programmatic document — “a charter of multipolarity and diversity in the 21st century.” In December 2024, a statement was issued by the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on their joint vision of such a charter, signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries (obviously, it was a continuation of the initiatives announced at the 2nd Minsk Conference on Eurasian Security). The document is a list of 21 points: 10 refers to the list of "key realities of our time", 11 - to what the parties "undertake". In point 15, entitled "Strengthening security", the parties committed to "forming a new pan-continental architecture of interaction in the field of security, based on the principles of the indivisibility of security, justice, legitimacy, sustainability andthe joint contribution of the participants." Obviously, work on the document is in full swing, as periodically reported by Russian diplomats at various levels at meetings with the representatives of Eurasian countries.
In the end, the emergence of a new concept of Eurasian security, as we see it, should have solved several discursive problems (and the “communicative” fervour of the idea is visible in all five principles voiced by Vladimir Putin at the meeting with the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry).
First, the initiative postulates a rejection of the “narrow” interpretation of the concept of “Eurasia” as part of the post-Soviet space, consisting of countries aimed at deepening integration with Russia, and the presentation of the Eurasian continent as a single security space (compare with the concept of the “Common European Home”, enshrined in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe). Second, the Eurasian security initiative is presented as an alternative to the established order (which often appears under the names of “European security” or “Euro-Atlantic security”), and, thus, “taking the tempo,” to use chess terminology – Russia, with which the representatives of the “Euro-Atlantic” approach to security associate their main threat, itself presents a security initiative to which it is necessary to respond (and the response, alas, is not difficult to predict).
The alternative nature of the Eurasian iteration of security is based on the denial of some (public or private) principles inherent in or correlated with “Euro-Atlantic” security. “Diversity”, i.e. “diversity of life foundations, civilisations, cultures, traditions, features of historical development, value systems, <…> diversity of forms of state political structure and models of internal socio-economic and cultural-humanitarian development”, was probably conceived as an alternative to the “uniformity”, which, as it seems, is achieved in the EU and NATO through ensuring “bloc discipline”. Eurasian security is so far demonstrated as a platform for a wide range of negotiations, during which, perhaps, the institutional content of the initiative will be determined. If we use architectural analogies, which is typical for this genre, instead of reinforced concrete "Euro-Atlantic" skyscrapers, it is proposed to move to highly mobile, fairly environmentally friendly and easy-to-maintain "Eurasian" yurts (or in North America, wigwams), which, unlike houses, are easy to install, fold and move to any available place.
However, the practical content of the initiative has yet to be determined. Of course, it is difficult to compete with a relatively well-established security system embodied in the form of NATO, which provides some security guarantees to its participants.
Balkan gunpowder for Eurasian powder flasks
While at the global level declarations of principles for building a new, more just world order may remain abstract, at the regional level we have to resolve specific security problems. The Balkan region today faces a security deficit, which is being filled (albeit less and less successfully) by the efforts of external players (here we mean NATO and the EU). Of course, with the end of the Yugoslav wars, which was forced by two episodes of NATO military intervention (both times against the Serbs), we can conclude that the peninsula is at peace. However, using the terminology of Johan Galtung, a “positive” peace is still far away: there is strong tension between Serbia and unrecognised Kosovo, the internal political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina is deepening, relations between Greece and Turkey are also far from being fully normalised, and “memory wars” are developing between Serbia and Croatia, as well as Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia. How can a Eurasian approach to security resolve these “knots” of conflict?
The Kosovo case is characterised by its multidimensionality. On the one hand, the problem is aggravated by the identity factor, which is one of the main resources for the ethnic mobilisation of the population - Kosovo is considered by the Serbs to be the “cradle of the nation”, the rejection of which would mean the onset of a critical situation for Serbian society, stimulating the onset of ontological insecurity. On the other hand, there is an American military base, Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, and there is also a UN KFOR peacekeeping mission, consisting mainly of contingents from NATO countries (Russian troops were withdrawn from Kosovo in 2004). In addition, in 2008 Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, and independent authorities continue to operate there to this day. The interests of Serbia and Kosovo are mutually irreconcilable, and the EU and the US, which have remained mediators in the settlement, are pursuing their own interests (linking the issue of Serbia's European integration with the Kosovo problem), which do not seem to include achieving a "positive" peace.
On the one hand, a Eurasian approach, featuring diversity and inclusiveness, could revive the peace process – convince the parties to return to negotiations, where Moscow’s goal would probably be the withdrawal of foreign troops from Kosovo and the launch of the process of the political dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina with the formation of the Community of Serbian Municipalities (both circumstances, alas, do not seem realistic yet). On the other hand, for now, Russian diplomacy is completely on Belgrade’s side, and the main point of the official position remains the call to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1224, according to which Kosovo should remain an integral part of Serbia. The latter reduces Moscow’s chances of playing the role of mediator between Belgrade and Pristina at a minimum.
Another acute problem in the Balkans is the internal political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is connected with the paralysis of state authorities due to the position of the Republic of Srpska and the crisis of legitimacy of the new High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Schmidt, whose mandate was not approved by the UN Security Council (due to the position of Russia and China) and whose activities are not recognised by the Bosnian Serbs. Of course, the situation is still far from the catastrophe that was stopped by the Dayton Agreement of 1995, which established peace between the main ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country received a confederative structure, now consisting of two entities: the Republic of Srpska and the Croat-Muslim Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The interests of the Serbs, on the one hand, and the Croats and Muslims, on the other, sharply diverge on the topic of European integration (and the related topic of anti-Russian sanctions), as well as on the problem of recognising responsibility for the war crimes of the Yugoslav wars. The situation is aggravated by mutual accusations between the parties, and now by the criminal prosecution of the leader of the Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik, who has been accused of calling for separatism.
The European approach, organised in the optics of the ideology of liberal democracy, is not inclusive - the Serbs are left "out in the cold"; its interests, as postulated by their authorities, do not include European integration. The Eurasian approach could normalise the situation, for example, by proposing to replace the UN High Representative with a more suitable candidate, with whom all the "state-forming peoples" of Bosnia and Herzegovina would agree. Dialogue "on equal terms" between the groups (even without external pressure), however, does not relieve mutual tension, aggravated, among other things, by the memory of the previous military conflict in Bosnia. The call for normalisation and the speech in support of compliance with the Dayton Agreement, of course, without specific initiatives, simply remain matters of discussion. However, the objective realities of the current moment seriously burden Moscow's ability to pursue its tangible policy in the region.
Eurasian security with Balkan specifics: instead of conclusions
So, Eurasian security, which combines “diversity and multipolarity”, is still being formed – and is being formed as a “global” approach aimed at finding a compromise with those who are ready to discuss this compromise. Nevertheless, these universalist principles, reminiscent of liberal foreign policy doctrine, are an alternative to the established “Euro-Atlantic” security system, which, in essence, can be considered part of a completely realistic struggle to reduce the “unipolar tilt”.
Perhaps, one option for the real content of the concept of Eurasian security will be the proposal of solutions for regional nodes of contradictions. The Balkan “node” continues to develop as part of the crisis of “Euro-Atlantic” security: the approaches proposed by the EU and the US have already failed to reduce the conflict potential of the region. Eurasian horizons, however, are rather dimly visible in the Balkans: if Eurasian security is a communicative act, then only Serbia and the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina are ready for this communication. For now, the focus of the new security initiative on constructive conversation takes it away from the possibility of fully competing with Euro-Atlantic approaches where they still dominate. The pinpoint changes that the Eurasian alternative can offer (for example, to make the Balkan parties seat at the negotiating table or adjust international efforts to normalise the dialogue of these parties) will not be able to fully realise all the security needs that the Balkan region is currently experiencing. The Eurasian security architecture still needs some kind of “middle-level” extension that adapts global postulates to regional realities.
