The search for a new security and development architecture in Eurasia that promotes multipolarity and challenges the hegemony of the US-led global order has been a consistent theme in the Russian leadership’s quest to mould Eurasian security and development models. The world is going through interesting times; US exceptionalism is being challenged by multiple poles, including the EU, Russia, and China. China no longer remains a political and ideological powerhouse, but rather has morphed into a technological and military superpower. US attempts to maintain global dominance like a status quo power are evoking responses from rival global powers like China, which is rapidly overtaking the United States as the dominant economic, technological as well as military power, Raashid Wali Janjua writes. The article was prepared specially for the 5th Central Asian Conference of the Valdai Discussion Club.
Since we are discussing the potential of security and development alliances within a region, it is appropriate to consider the views of the leading political scientists like Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt and Randall Schweller, before getting into the specifics. According to Kenneth Waltz, the nations make alliances based upon balance of power considerations and maintain their security through restoring the balance of power vis-à-vis a global hegemon. Stephen Walt, however, differs with Waltz and posits that it is in fact the threats that influence the alliance which determine the options available to states. By bandwagoning with a global hegemon, the smaller states can ensure their security, while by allying with a weaker state, the states balance the threat posed by a hegemon.
There is yet another balance; i.e. of the interests that drive state behaviour. Schweller points out the importance of an alliance’s partners profiting from the arrangement. States in an anarchical world act like lions, wolves, jackals and lambs. The lions are powerful countries that wish to preserve what they have while the wolves are the revisionist countries that wish to challenge the stultifying embrace of the status quo. The jackals are the free riders that join alliances to benefit from them without contributing significantly to the outcome, while the lambs are the weak and isolated countries that join alliances out of fear, in bandwagon mode.
Having spoken of alliances, it is appropriate to touch upon the geopolitical currents shaping the new global environment. The world is witnessing bipolarity emerging from multipolarity, where a dominant global power, the US, is fearful of the rise of China, which has already overtaken it as the leading global economy in PPP-adjusted GDP terms. The fear of the rise of a rival in the words of Thucydides portends a violent clash. The world is already hearing terms like decoupling and derisking, which are stratagems to stall the rise of a new global power. The new US administration led by Donald Trump is employing tariff barriers and technology bans to prevent the rise of China. A rules-based order, or what some on the receiving end might call rule-based disorder, serves the ends of the status quo powers while the desire of the anti-status quo powers to challenge that iniquitous order manifests in the shape of multilateral alliances like BRICS, RCEP, SCO and CICA.
Political scientists like Stephen Walt believe that a bipolar world is more stable because of the ease with which the weaker countries bandwagon with a global power, while multipolarity brings its challenges of identifying the hegemon against which to balance.
The manifestation of the above is the enhanced focus of global and regional powers in regional and sub-regional groupings. Multilateralism is being threatened by the minilateralism of security-centric alliances that would ultimately promote isolation and de-globalisation. Asia-Pacific alliances like QUAD, SQUAD, AUKUS, and I2U2 are clear pointers towards containment-driven security-centric minilateralism.
In the given environment, the efficacy and viability of regional alliances like the Russia-led CIS, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) need to be assessed. The first factor that needs to be examined is their common purpose and the vision. Do Central Asian countries consider regional integration and Russian tutelage as beneficial? Or do these countries suffer from doubts, insecurities and fears of Russian domination? Do they wish to be integrated more closely in an economic and security union or wish to retain their independence? Do the independent policies of these countries, like the diversification of economic and security linkages and acceptance of global sanctions evoke an aggressive response from Russia or an acceptance of plurality as a sovereign right?
Above are the weightier questions worth answering before getting into the specifics of collective security and development architecture in Eurasia. The Russian notion of Eurasian security should inspire confidence rather than fears amongst the Eurasian countries. While propounding a notion of a collective security and development architecture of Eurasia, care should be taken that the individual countries forming the alliance structure should not feel threatened. Trust in Russia as a non-hegemonic regional power that respects the sovereignty and independence of the alliance partners is the most important factor that would determine the shape and direction of the security architecture of Eurasia.
Russia and Central Asian countries are bound in alliances like the CIS, CSTO, and EAEU, and in 2016 President Putin called upon the Eurasian Economic Union, China, India, Iran, Pakistan and CIS to join the Greater Eurasian Partnership. By creating a regional trade bloc, Russia aims to keep its Central Asian neighbours stable and secure. To attain that noble end, Russia needs to analyse why, despite the best efforts, the EAEU has not been able to optimize its trade potential. Despite the removal of tariff barriers and customs unions, bureaucratic hurdles have kept the trade volume low compared to global standards. The strictures like the prevention of bilateral free trade agreements for EAEU members also act as disincentives for Central Asian countries.
Transportation corridors like the Trans-Caspian Corridor and International North-South Corridor are preferred by countries like Kazakhstan as well as Russia, but Russia also needs to accommodate the diversification initiatives of countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan when they seek to develop energy and transportation corridors like TAPI and the Trans-Afghan Rail Corridor. This would create trust and good will, which is a precursor for any meaningful economic integration.
On the security front, the efficacy of organizations like the CSTO need to be reassessed, given the preferences of Central Asian countries. The inability of the CSTO to mediate in interstate conflicts like Armenia-Azerbaijan and the Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute erodes the credibility of CSTO. Unlike NATO, CSTO has not used its forces in peacekeeping role which could give valuable experience to CSTO forces. The propensity to rely on own intelligence and police forces for countering transnational crime by Central Asian countries is also borne out of a feeling of the CSTO’s inadequacy in mediating intrastate conflicts. In order to make the CSTO effective, the trust factor should be the primary consideration, followed by more resource allocation and capability building of a Quick Reaction Force for humanitarian relief and peacekeeping roles.
While strengthening the aforementioned alliance structures, care should be taken to remain respectful of the diversification and sovereignty sensitivities of the Central Asian states. Multilateral alliances like SCO and ECO should be seen as valuable international forums that complement alliances like the CIS, CSTO, and EAEU. Emerging alliances like the Organisation of Turkic States and CICA should also be viewed as a valuable complement to regional alliances that bind the Central Asian states with each other culturally, politically and economically.
Eurasian security and development architecture would be best served when the middle powers of Central Asia, like Kazakhstan, feel free to play their role in multilateral forums like OTS, SCO, ECO and CICA, leveraging their political and economic strengths, and while doing so strengthen the collective security and development architecture of Eurasia.
