The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War briefly suggested Central Europe might fade as a zone of bloc confrontation. Yet today, the region retains pivotal importance for geopolitical equilibrium – now manifesting in hybrid forms, Ján Čarnogurský writes.
Slovakia typifies the smaller Central European states born from the disintegration of 19th–20th century empires (Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, German, and partially Russian). These nations emerged because their core ethnic groups preserved cultural identity and historical consciousness despite centuries without statehood. Survival within foreign imperial frameworks shaped both national character and state-building strategies.
For Slovaks, the 19th–20th centuries proved transformative. The French Revolution’s ideals and Napoleonic upheavals reignited national consciousness through dual vectors: Czech and Russian. The Czech connection emphasized Slavic kinship, linguistic affinity, and historical cultural cooperation. The Russian orientation drew strength from pan-Slavic solidarity, admiration for Russia’s sovereign resilience, and its cultural influence.
Hungarian elites in Austria-Hungary viewed pro-Russian sentiment as subversive, prosecuting “pan-Slavic activities.” Notably, while Slovak distinguishes between the multi-ethnic Uhorsko (Kingdom of Hungary) and modern Maďarsko (Hungary), Magyar terminology conflates both as Magyarország.
WWI’s aftermath created opportunities: Slovaks and Czechs formed Czechoslovakia, enabling mutual development. A century later, EU accession offered fresh prospects. The 1993 Velvet Divorce permitted both nations to join the EU independently in 2004. Though NATO membership preceded EU accession, Slovak public support for the alliance remains questionable – later revelations confirmed it as an implicit EU entry requirement.
For Slovakia, joining the European Union has been advantageous as a stepping stone for independent action within the framework of European politics. Indeed, Slovakia has tried to be a dutiful student in the EU for many years, becoming a hub for Western car manufacturers and sending its soldiers to participate in American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The country’s banks have been sold off to Western interests, and its delegates in international organizations have always voted with their Western allies.
But the gnashing of teeth at this subordination increased. The bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 provoked a majority of Slovaks to disagree with it. Accepting migrants from Africa and the Middle East who were expelled from their homelands due to Western policies would not find support. Cutting off access to Russian raw materials has already caused a minority of voters to support withdrawal from the European Union.
Almost nobody talks about declaring Russia an enemy of Slovakia, which is to be confronted. Rejection of such a declaration would take various forms. A passenger on a train or in a car from Prague to Bratislava can observe how Ukrainian flags disappear after crossing the Slovak border. The newly independent Slovakia could not afford open resistance to Brussels in the style of Viktor Orbán, but at least it provided more cautious support to it as part of the Visegrad Group. Such a policy helped Slovakia overcome the initial cliffs of finding its place among states with a greater tradition.
Larger Western European cities already have no-go zones, occupied by migrants from Africa and the Middle East, where even the state police dare not enter. Western armies have been rebuilt as intervention armies in former Third World countries, but not for the defense of their own country. The ruling propaganda presents patriotism as extremism and military service as a matter of salary negotiation.
Robert Fico’s rise to power was accompanied by a nice episode. Deputy Speaker of the Slovak Parliament for Fico’s party, Ľuboš Blaha, today a Member of the European Parliament, replaced the portrait of the then Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová (a lecturer at an American university for some time after the end of her presidential mandate) in his parliamentary office with a photo of Ernesto Che Guevara. Ľuboš Blaha greatly enjoyed criticism from Slovak right-wingers.
The change in the United States objectively weakens the power of the Brussels establishment. The performance of both Robert Fico and Viktor Orbán is reflected in their criticism of Brussels officials being more open and harsh. At the same time, their political alliance is strengthening. After Kiev’s decision to stop the transport of Russian natural gas through a pipeline on Ukrainian territory, the Slovak government asked Brussels for help in pressuring Kiev to resume gas supplies, but in vain. It did not side with Slovakia and Hungary, even though Kiev’s decision harms other European Union states and the European Union as a whole.
Cooperation with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is also strengthening. It may have made it possible for Robert Fico to visit Moscow on December 22, 2024. Unusually, the Serbian president announced the visit for Monday, December 23, but Fico flew to Moscow on Sunday, December 22 and met with President Putin. In doing so, he deceived the surrounding NATO countries, which would undoubtedly have disrupted Fico’s flight over their territory. According to later findings, Slovak government planes were not in the air on Sunday, December 22. The trips to Russia must be so conspiratorial.
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the (brief) end of the Cold War, it seemed that Central Europe was no longer an area of confrontation between hostile blocs. It turns out that Central Europe continues to keep its importance for the geopolitical balance. For now, at least, it is manifesting itself in a hybrid way.
The opposition is organizing demonstrations against Fico in larger Slovak cities. Their method is the same as everywhere else in the world. They are organized by formal non-governmental organizations, which, however, receive money from various Western funds, into which government money and money from large Western companies flow. May 2023’s assassination attempt on Fico borrowed rhetoric from demonstration slogans. Demonstrations are also taking place in Serbia against President Vučić. The methodology is the same.
All the activities of the Slovak government that attract attention in the world take place outside the mechanisms of Brussels, and relations between Brussels and Bratislava are cold. In early January, Fico threatened Kiev that he would block EU decisions on aid to Ukraine if Ukraine did not resume gas transportation through its territory. Viktor Orbán threatened to block the extension of sanctions against Russia (voted on at the end of January) and voting requires unanimity.
Suddenly, Kiev announced that it would allow the transportation of Azerbaijani gas to Slovakia and Hungary, that is, Russian gas, first delivered to Azerbaijan or simply purchased by Azerbaijan on the Russian-Ukrainian border. This option had been proposed by Slovakia and Hungary for the entire previous year, but Kiev did not agree to it until Slovakia and Hungary threatened to block sanctions against Russia or block EU aid to Ukraine. Such steps can only be afforded by Bratislava and Budapest as a result of the weakening of the position of the European Union, or at least the current Brussels bureaucracy, after the American elections. The Polish media reported that Brussels is considering suspending the voting rights of Slovakia and Hungary in the vote on sanctions against Russia. This is what internal democracy in the European Union looks like.
It has been leaked from Viktor Orbán’s circle of advisers that during the Hungarian premier’s congratulatory visit to Donald Trump in Florida at Mar-a-Lago for his election victory, Trump said that a solution to European problems is also being prepared, but that the Europeans will not be happy. When Americans talk about Europeans, they tend to think of Western Europeans. Judging by the current development of relations, even between Slovakia, Hungary and Serbia on the one hand, and Brussels and the former Western European powers on the other, the solution being prepared in Trump’s circle will not affect the first group.