The European Union is carefully weighing its response to Donald Trump’s threatening statements, which have yet to crystallize into a coherent trade policy. Most analysts predict that the EU will propose a compromise package, offering concessions in exchange for the US refraining from imposing tariffs. For Central European “sovereigntists,” the ability to safeguard their interests amid US pressure will serve as a critical test of their strategic viability, writes Anton Bespalov, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
The internal political dynamics of the European Union are currently shaped by two key trends. On one hand, there is a deepening divide between the elites and the general population of member states. On the other, several EU countries have seen the rise of political forces that prioritize national sovereignty and diverge from the liberal-globalist agenda. Poland, under the Law and Justice party, and Hungary, under Viktor Orbán, are the most prominent examples. For years, liberal media and think tanks in the US and EU have sounded the alarm, claiming that Poland and Hungary are undermining democracy and pushing Europe to the brink of collapse. The victory of the pro-European Civic Coalition in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections brought a sigh of relief to the Western world, as Poland seemed to return to the “right side of history.”
Notably, Poland’s foreign policy has consistently aligned with broader European interests, raising no concerns among its Western allies. In fact, its hawkish stance toward Russia, supported by the Baltic and Nordic countries, has become the European mainstream. Hungary, however, has taken a different path since the start of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, expressing views that have irritated its NATO and EU partners. This divergence has even cooled Hungary’s traditionally friendly relations with Poland, where Orbán is now labeled a “pro-Russian” politician. A similar accusation has been levelled at Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico following his election victory in October 2023.
While the influence of Hungary and Slovakia within the EU is limited, Orbán and Fico have positioned themselves as leaders advocating for the interests of Europe as a whole. They argue that pursuing a “strategic defeat” of Russia is futile, a stance that resonates beyond their borders, especially in a context where the governments of several major European countries do not fully reflect the electoral preferences of their populations. This divergence has gained significance in light of Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election. During his campaign, Trump, who is sceptical of the European Union, praised Orbán, and the Hungarian prime minister, now leading an “offensive on Brussels,” hopes to become Trump’s trusted ally in Europe.
Both Orbán and Fico emphasize the importance of sovereignty, asserting that their countries’ participation in the EU should not undermine it. However, this vision is increasingly seen by European elites as a threat that must be countered by any means necessary. This tension is evident in the context of Romania’s presidential elections at the end of 2024. The possibility of electing a president who prioritizes national interests within the EU and NATO has triggered a series of events reminiscent of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” two decades ago. In Romania, the ruling “pro-European” elites are working to prevent the victory of an undesirable candidate, much as Ukraine’s ruling class once sought to block a “pro-European” politician.
The first round of Romania’s presidential elections, won by Călin Georgescu, was annulled by the Constitutional Court following allegations that his TikTok campaign was financed by Russia. However, it was later revealed that the campaign was funded by the pro-European National Liberal Party, which sought to siphon votes from Georgescu’s main rival. The absence of Russian interference highlighted that Georgescu’s success was driven by protest voting. British political scientist Tom Gallagher, in his book Romania and the European Union: How the Weak Vanquished the Strong, argues that Romania’s EU accession led to the unprecedented enrichment of the “pro-European” elite, with little improvement in the living standards of the general population. This discontent is increasingly reflected in election outcomes. Nevertheless, the Western political mainstream has dismissed Georgescu’s rise by labelling him a “far-right” politician with “pro-Russian” views, despite the lack of evidence for such claims.
Georgescu, along with his rival Elena Lasconi, criticized the Constitutional Court’s decision and demanded that the second round proceed based on the first-round results. However, the Romanian government annulled the results and scheduled new elections for May 4. While Georgescu remains a leading candidate, his prospects are uncertain.
Even if “pro-European” forces ultimately prevail in Romania, the Central European “sovereignists” may gain allies in the Czech Republic and Austria. In the Czech Republic, the Eurosceptic party of former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš is favored in the upcoming October parliamentary elections. In Austria, the Freedom Party, described as “friendly to Russia,” won the October elections, though no accusations of “Russian interference” were voiced. Its leader, Herbert Kickl, tasked with forming a new government, has been dubbed the “new Orbán” for his emphasis on national interests, conservative values, and criticism of sanctions against Russia and unconditional support for Ukraine.
The characterization of Central European “sovereigntists” as “pro-Russian” is largely detached from reality, yet it remains a potent tool in political battles, as evidenced by the massive protests against Fico in Slovakia. Meanwhile, their ties with the United States are undeniable. Leaders like Orbán, Fico, and Babiš openly express sympathy for Donald Trump, sharing his conservative values – a stark contrast to most Western European leaders. Notably, Orbán is seen in the US as a model for Trump’s policies, sparking concerns about the “Orbanisation of America.”
What does this ideological alignment between American conservatives and Central European “sovereigntists” mean in practice? Trump’s threats – whether imposing tariffs on European goods if the EU does not purchase more American LNG or demanding that European NATO members increase defence spending to 5% of GDP – directly impact these countries. Aligning with US conservatism is one thing; complying with demands that could harm their own populations is another. For instance, potential tariffs on EU cars would significantly affect Hungary’s economy, given the integration of supply chains. Similarly, demands to reduce technological and investment cooperation with China would undermine the economic aspirations of Hungary and Slovakia.
The European Union is exploring responses to Trump’s threats, which have yet to materialize into a coherent trade policy. Analysts suggest the EU will propose a compromise, offering concessions in exchange for the US dropping tariffs For Central European “sovereigntists,” the most concerning elements of a potential transatlantic deal are the shifting of military aid burdens to Ukraine onto European NATO members and restrictions on cooperation with China. The ability to defend their interests on these issues will be the ultimate test of viability of their strategу.
