BRICS and Economic Cooperation
The High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB), 2023, [High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB). 2023. A Breakthrough for People and Planet: Effective and Inclusive Global Governance for Today and the Future. United Nations University. New York.] whose many recommendations are central to the founding motive of the BRICS bloc in 2009, spells out the challenges facing global economic development (HLAB,2023).
It spells out six shifts, among which a shift in the global financial architecture is a key feature. The BRICS bloc began its journey in 2009 to pursue reform and development, democratisation, representativity, and equity in global governance. To this end, much momentum has been garnered together with other global efforts, towards persuading for the much-needed reforms. At its 15th Summit of Heads of State and Government, the bloc instructed its finance ministers and central bank governors to investigate the feasibility of an additional payment system (BRICS Johannesburg 2 Declaration, 2023).
Much is therefore expected of the 2024 Summit, with great anticipation for a possible announcement of a new payment system, its scale, and resumption date. This is particularly so considering the discourse on de-dollarisation, greater intra-BRICS trade and cooperation, and the advantages of BRICS + expansion. Some have suggested that the BRICS bloc cooperates mainly on multilateral issues that emerged during the 2008 global financial crisis
. Others, such as Prado
and Prado and Hoffman (Prado, M. M., & Hoffman, S. J. (2019). The promises and perils of international institutional bypasses: defining a new concept and its policy implications for global governance. Transnational Legal Theory, 10(3-4), 275-294.), investigate the use of International Institutional Bypass as a means of response to the challenges that have given rise to blocs such as BRICS. Kubayi
for his part, identifies a Marxian/Gramscian concept of a war of position to attain a passive revolution in which reform into a fit-for-purpose institutional architecture of global governance is achieved and collectively owned. Whichever lens one uses to inspect the BRICS bloc, 16 years after its inception, it has realised a multilateral development bank (MDB) in the form of the New Development Bank (NDB) and is officially developing a new global payment system.
These two developments in financial arrangements are the most visible of the BRICS interventions. Much is still to be seen in progress towards realising the ‘BRICS long-term goals: Roadmaps and pathways (2017)’, as in the publication of the recommendations proposing long-term steps and planning by the BRICS Think Tank Council. However, its total effort goes well beyond that, considering its activities in the G20, the UN, and the broader societal discourse of reform and development. Its responsibility to developing economies, especially in the Global South, is under constant observation, and given the urgency for development and relief from poverty, inequalities, and other suffering, it is observed with keen anticipation.
Is the BRICS Bloc pursuing a New Global Agend
Zondi et al.,
argue for deeper intra-BRICS cooperation to harness collective advantages and strengths to achieve its ends. This is also echoed by Zhongxiu and Qingx
particularly taking advantage of its population and economic growth. Both these texts suggest the harnessing of the strength of BRICS, a strength that can be of great value in multilateralism (Stuekel, 2013), especially for the benefit of developing economies. The greater global situation is well-known and is both intensively and extensively documented. The global response to the situation is beginning to attract popular attention. This has been evident in the momentum toward the Summit of the Future and after the adoption of the PFTF.99
The global reform and development agenda is old and has manifested in different ways on different occasions, such as the New International Economic Order, a declaration adopted by the UN on May 1, 1974 (
www.unctad.org). This effort waned as quickly as it emerged, as have others. However, in the 70s, the economies of the BRICS members were not as developed and as advanced as they are today, nor did they enjoy the level of influence during the Cold War and succeeding periods that they do today. Today, we have commentaries on Jim O’Neill’s 2001 paper on ‘building better economic BRICs,’
.] as if he were responsible for the bloc existing. Others talk of the rise of the Global South
. Many, including BRICS countries, argue that it is a new reality that must be reflected in a reformed and fit-for-purpose institutional architecture of global governance.
It may well be necessary to define a new global agenda beyond what has already been discussed. However, what is certainly clear is that there is a shift toward multipolarity, one founded centrally on the inadequacy of the current international system and the history of pains of underdevelopment, inequalities, and other malaise that the majority of the global population has had had to endure. Perhaps the shift towards multipolarity and a fairer global governance system is the ‘New Global Agenda,’ which BRICS has been arguing about since 2009. The outcomes of the adoption of a new payment system, the expansion of the NDB, and other BRICS initiatives will be the most telling regarding what the new global agenda is, or at the very least, what the BRICS Reform and Development Agenda is.