The degradation of US-China relations and ASEAN’s inability to effectively cope with the most sensitive security challenges have called into question the central role of the Association and created a fundamental dilemma for the ASEAN - how to organically fit into the emerging regional and global order and not lose its relevance, writes Alexander Korolev.
During the Cold War, the centre of gravity of the confrontation between the US and the USSR was in Europe, but Southeast Asia could not avoid immediate security threats. This circumstance largely forced the Association to formulate and in practice “sharpen” its basic principles, in other words, to follow its own “ASEAN Way”. The key pillars of the Association were to maintain its status as a neutral bloc and protect the internal affairs of member-countries from the interference of external players. This was reflected in the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration in Southeast Asia (ZOPFAN), adopted in 1971.
A similar logic developed for the countries of Southeast Asia following the collapse of the USSR, when after many years a “vacuum” of leadership emerged in the region, which was gradually filled by major players - the United States and China. However, the period from the early 1990s until Donald Trump’s first term was not overshadowed by tough confrontation between Washington and Beijing or its direct projection onto Southeast Asia. This allowed the ASEAN countries to remain in a relative zone of geopolitical comfort for many years, benefiting from the rivalry between Washington and Beijing and simultaneously increasing their political capital in the form of flagship initiatives, agreements and various multilateral formats. Thus, in 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum on Security was created, and in 1997, the ASEAN+3 dialogue format to combat the consequences of the Asian economic crisis. In 2002, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was adopted as a conceptual vision for resolving the territorial conflict with China. In 2005, the East Asia Summit (EAS) was established, which at that time united the "ten" ASEAN members and six dialogue partners. Finally, in 2010, the first ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting in an expanded format (ADMM Plus) was held.
With ASEAN’s increased activity addressing external affairs and amid the dynamic process of institution-building, the term "central role" appeared in the diplomatic lexicon of the Association. It was first used in official ASEAN documents in 2006 following a meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers. It was then enshrined in the ASEAN Charter of 2008. The economic component of "centrality" was supplemented by a general strategic one, which turned the Association, as conceived by its member countries, into a key driving force in interaction with external partners.
Since then, at the expert and official levels, this term has been associated not only with ASEAN's ability to build a multilateral dialogue with foreign partners and contribute to maintaining a stable security and economic architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, but also to maintain unity within the Association. The latter element is the main problem currently facing the Association.
ASEAN and the "Old-Age Crisis"
ASEAN itself has become a hostage to its own image, which it has been crafting for many years. The characteristics that were held up as an example for the Association (adaptability to the external environment, flexibility, consideration of the individual characteristics of member countries) have in recent years become a symbol of failure and crises, with which ASEAN has become increasingly associated in recent years.
This state of affairs is a consequence of a number of external and internal factors facing ASEAN.
First, there is the consistent strengthening of China's power on the global stage and in Southeast Asia, particularly with the arrival of Xi Jinping and due to the degradation of US-China relations since Donald Trump came to power in the US. With the onset of the trade war and the promotion of US Indo-Pacific strategy as a means of containing China, ASEAN has increasingly come to be perceived as an object and, to a certain extent, a product of the US-Chinese rivalry, rather than an independent and self-sufficient entity on the world stage. It is characteristic that in recent years, there has been increasing talk that over time, the ASEAN countries will be forced to make a choice in favour of Beijing or Washington as relations between the US and China further deteriorate.
Second, Donald Trump during his first presidential term effectively nullified Barack Obama's strategy towards ASEAN, which was based on the recognition of ASEAN's central role in the regional security architecture and economy, maximum US involvement in ASEAN-centric dialogue formats and the participation of the US head of state in various summits of the Association. Trump has ignored the ASEAN's multilateral diplomacy, which was a painful blow to the positioning of the Association and its subjectivity. It is no coincidence that under Trump, the post of US Permanent Ambassador to ASEAN has remained vacant.
Third, in many ways ASEAN has hit the ceiling of its capabilities amid unreasonably high expectations. Regarding external relations, the main processes of institution-building have been completed. The Association has managed to form a ramified system in the form of free trade zones with a number of leading countries, various dialogue partnerships and platforms like the EAS. Individual point changes within these formats will not cause much excitement and will not create tangible reputational benefits for ASEAN. At the same time, the focus on deepening institutional processes within the Association itself has not fully justified itself. For example, within the framework of the ASEAN Economic Community created in 2015, the participating countries have set the task of turning the Association into a single market and production base by 2025. However, in fact, the Association is “stuck” at the first stage of economic integration - a free trade area, although more than 30 years have passed since the ratification of the FTA agreement.
Finally, ASEAN is facing two interrelated problems - a crisis of unity and a reduction of diplomatic resources. They tie the hands of the Association in choosing an effective and coordinated response to growing security challenges. Here it is appropriate to cite three major pain points for ASEAN - the crisis in Myanmar, the conflict in the South China Sea and the militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region.
Political Crisis in Myanmar
Following the military coup in 2021, Myanmar has replaced China as the main source of headaches for ASEAN. As a result, resolving the political crisis in the country is one of the key priorities of ASEAN and the Malaysian chairmanship of the Association in 2025, in particular. This problem clearly demonstrates the failure of consensus within the Association, the limited resource potential of ASEAN and the different approaches of countries to resolving the crisis. Over the past few years, the leaders of ASEAN have confirmed this directly. In particular, in 2023, the year of Indonesia's ASEAN chairmanship, then-Indonesian President Joko Widodo spoke openly about the lack of unity in the Association and the insignificant progress it has made in implementing the five-point consensus on resolving the crisis. At the same time, Jakarta has repeatedly criticized Myanmar's military leadership and called for decisive action against Naypyidaw.
Malaysia arguably took an even tougher stance against the current regime in Myanmar, becoming the first ASEAN country to publicly declare that it would not support the parliamentary elections planned to take place in the country in 2023, which in fact did not take place. For Malaysia, which positions itself as the voice of global Islam, the problem of the military coup in Myanmar is superimposed on another, more sensitive issue: the alleged genocide of Rohingya Muslims and the subsequent influx of refugees into Malaysia, which poses a threat to national security. From time to time, Malaysian officials, at parliamentary hearings or press conferences, “smash” the ASEAN-centric principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. For example, the country’s former Prime Minister Abdul Razak called on the Association’s countries to abandon this principle in an ad hoc format and conduct a military intervention in Myanmar in order to stop the genocide of Muslims.
There is no ready-made solution on Myanmar on the horizon, which is leading ASEAN diplomacy to a dead end. On the one hand, the Association de jure and de facto lacks real military-political leverage over the Myanmar leadership, including sanctions as an instrument of intimidation and punishment. Open criticism and calls from Malaysia and Indonesia to act more decisively towards the military regime are not supported by other partners of the Association, particularly Laos, Thailand and Cambodia.
I will admit that individual countries of the Association would be happy to disown the "prodigal son". However, ASEAN understands that excluding Myanmar from the Association without resolving the crisis is impossible, dangerous and pointless for political and strategic reasons. In the event of exclusion, a negative precedent will be created; ASEAN as an Association would essentially be admitting incompetence. In the eyes of the world community, the basic principles of the Association's functioning would be discredited, and there would be no trace left of the colourful slogan "One vision, one identity, one community".
The South China Sea Issue
Since the adoption of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, the countries of the Association have failed to reach a consensus and develop a unified approach to the settlement of territorial disputes. The Philippines, which is allied with the United States, continues to pursue the most active policy of containing China among other ASEAN countries.
A number of other ASEAN states, including those directly involved in the conflict (Malaysia, Brunei) have chosen a more restrained position. They refrain from publicly criticising Beijing's actions in the South China Sea and only limit themselves to routine calls to respect international law and move toward signing the Code of Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea (SCS). At the same time, Laos and Cambodia, which are strongly influenced by China, often disrupt ASEAN's work in this area by siding with Beijing. In particular, Cambodia twice blocked the adoption of a joint final communiqué at the level of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, in 2012 and 2016, due to disagreements over the SCS issue, which was publicly approved by China.
Given the current crisis of unity in ASEAN, the systemic shortage of diplomatic resources and the absence of coercive instruments from China, the chances of adopting a Code to replace the failed Declaration in the foreseeable future are slim. The process of coordinating the countries' positions will likely drag on for many years, especially given the situation in Myanmar, which is distracting the attention and resources of other members of the Association.
Militarisation in the Indo-Pacific region
Another problematic point for ASEAN and a blow to its central role is the expansion of the network of US-centric military-political alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. As in the two previous cases, the development of umbrella formats for containing China reinforces the dividing lines between ASEAN member countries that adhere to different approaches. In particular, Malaysia and Indonesia are the most active among the Southeast Asian countries in adhering to non-aligned logic in foreign policy, have publicly sounded the alarm about the trilateral AUKUS alliance involving Australia, Great Britain and the United States. The leaders of both countries have repeatedly emphasised that the creation of AUKUS does not take into account the security interests of other regional players and symbolises the return of the Cold War logic in the region. In particular, during his speech at the Boao Forum for Asia in 2023, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim made it clear that Kuala Lumpur does not intend to support AUKUS, giving preference to the ASEAN-centric security architecture.
Both countries have similar positions on the issue of promoting the Indo-Pacific region concept and specifically QUAD. It is no coincidence that Indonesia developed an alternative vision of the Indo-Pacific region, which was later extrapolated to all of ASEAN. The ASEAN interpretation of the Indo-Pacific region is fundamentally different from the American version. It is not anti-Chinese in nature and, unsurprisingly, brings ASEAN to the forefront as a key platform for multilateral dialogue.
At the same time, some other ASEAN countries (Vietnam and the Philippines), which have deep historical and modern traumas in their interaction with China, are increasingly leaning towards the United States and its allies in matters of regional security. In particular, Hanoi is a member of the expanded QUAD+ format. Since Ferdinand Marcos Jr. came to power, Manila has not hidden its anti-Chinese sentiments and is increasing military-technical cooperation in bilateral, trilateral (with the participation of Japan and the United States) and multilateral formats. Moreover, during his speech at the Lowy Institute in Australia in March 2024, Marcos Jr. spoke complimentarily about AUKUS, noting that the alliance's work helps maintain stability in the region and strengthen the central role of ASEAN.
Apparently, the new Trump administration will try to more massively enlist the support of Vietnam and, first of all, the Philippines by developing a bilateral military-technical dialogue and involving both countries in network formats to contain China. Against this background, it is characteristic that a couple of days after Trump's official inauguration as president on January 22, 2025, a telephone conversation took place between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Philippine counterpart. During the talks, the parties spoke firmly regarding the PRC, and the American side expressed its intention to “rigorously fulfil” the obligations within the framework of the alliance treaty. Such efforts by the United States threaten to further undermine unity within ASEAN and its authority as an independent centre of power.
In essence, ASEAN is entering a new stage of open great-power confrontation with "domestic" problems as baggage. This does not presage the decline of the Association in the legal and normative sense of the word. However, numerous crises within the Association and the growth of scepticism among the member countries themselves regarding ASEAN's ability to fulfil its basic functions seriously force us to think about reconsidering the central role of the Association.
