Valdai Club

Unlike past eras of intense great power struggles, Afghanistan today is more of a challenge to be managed than a prize to be won. It requires careful management rather than conquest. While regional actors engage selectively, none are willing to bear the full burden of stabilising the country, Muhammad Taimur Fahad Khan writes.

Afghanistan has long been a focal point of great power rivalries, from the 19^th-century “Great Game” between Britain and Russia to the Soviet invasion and the US-led “war on terror”. Today, however, the question arises: is Afghanistan still central to global geopolitics, or has it become a problem no major power wants to own? This commentary explores Afghanistan’s evolving geopolitical landscape, the role of major powers, the challenges it faces under Taliban rule, and its regional and humanitarian implications.

A shift from the “Great Game” paradigm

Historically, Afghanistan was a prized chessboard for competing empires. The British and Russian empires manoeuvred to control it, and later, the Soviet and American interventions proved equally futile. The 2021 US withdrawal marked a new phase where no single power seeks outright dominance. Instead, Afghanistan now presents a complex, multifaceted challenge that regional actors engage with cautiously, balancing security concerns, economic opportunities, and ideological differences.

Major powers and their interests

The geopolitical significance of Afghanistan remains, but the dynamics have shifted. The major players today each have their own distinct priorities and are carefully calibrating their approaches.

• United States has largely withdrawn but retains financial leverage through sanctions and the freezing of Afghan assets. This leverage also ultimately extends to political and diplomatic leverage over Afghanistan since the threat of direct and secondary sanctions by the US has prevented the international community from officially recognizing the Taliban regime, despite more than three years having passed since their takeover of Kabul in August 2021. Counterterrorism remains Washington’s main concern, as demonstrated by the 2022 drone strike on Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Additionally, the US continues counterterrorism coordination with Pakistan, exemplified by the recent capture and extradition of a top-tier operational leader of the ISKP (Islamic State Khorasan Province ) named Shareefullah (an Afghan national), who was involved in an attack, which left thirteen US servicemen dead in 2021. However, Afghanistan is no longer a strategic priority, as evidenced by statements from US leaders and officials, along with the shutting down of the US embassy in Kabul in August 2021 and the Afghan embassy and two consulates in the US in March 2022. This shift has allowed regional actors to fill the vacuum.

• China maintains diplomatic ties with the Taliban and sent its ambassador to Afghanistan in September 2023, focusing on economic opportunities, particularly in minerals and transit routes. A $540 million oil extraction deal was signed in 2023, signalling Beijing’s growing economic interest. However, concerns over security threats from Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP ) hinder deeper engagement. In addition, one of China’s priorities in Afghanistan also remains to ensure that Afghan soil is not used by East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM ) militants against its Xinjiang region. At the same time, Beijing is also focused on protecting its broader economic and strategic interests, particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This multi-billion-dollar initiative has frequently come under attack from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other terrorist groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), which are operating from Afghan territory. Consequently, China remains engaged with both the Taliban and regional actors to mitigate these security threats while pursuing economic opportunities in Afghanistan.

• Russia remains wary of instability spilling into Central Asia. Moscow has kept its Kabul embassy open but has not recognised the Taliban government yet. However, Moscow has removed the Taliban from its list of designated terrorist organisations. Security threats persist, as seen in the 2022 ISIS-K attack on the Russian Embassy and the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow. Russia, deeply concerned about the presence of ISIS-K in Afghanistan, is particularly cautious as it seeks to avoid a repeat of its difficult experience with the group in Syria. To address the Afghan conundrum, Russia has taken a proactive diplomatic approach, initiating platforms such as the Moscow Format and the Troika Plus meetings, engaging both regional and extra-regional stakeholders. It regularly hosts the Taliban alongside other Afghan factions and international actors to facilitate dialogue and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a hub of instability. Despite its measured engagement, Russia is closely monitoring developments, balancing security threats with diplomatic pragmatism.

• Pakistan has historically maintained close ties with the Taliban, seeking cooperative relations. However, the resurgence of the TTP and other terrorist outfits like the BLA and BRA, operating from Afghan sanctuaries, has posed serious security challenges. Pakistan witnessed a 60% increase in terrorist attacks in 2023. With 1,612 fatalities (military and civilian combined), 2024 was the deadliest year for Pakistan, marking a significant escalation in terrorist activity and underscoring the growing security threat posed by militant groups operating from Afghan territory. Diplomatic engagements between Islamabad and Kabul continue, but tensions remain over cross-border militancy and border security.

• India initially saw the Taliban’s return as a setback but has cautiously re-engaged, reopening its Kabul mission and providing humanitarian aid. While security risks persist, India is exploring limited economic opportunities, contingent on improved stability.

• Iran continues pragmatic engagement with the Taliban, driven by concerns over refugees, water disputes, and Sunni extremist threats. Clashes over the Helmand River and the safety of Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara minority remain contentious issues, yet Tehran maintains diplomatic channels to safeguard its interests.

Taliban Rule: challenges and realities

The Taliban’s governance has reinforced fears of regression. Despite initial promises, they have reinstated draconian restrictions on women and girls, banning secondary and higher education and limiting female employment. Dissent is suppressed, and public executions and floggings have returned. The absence of an inclusive government and reliance on hard-line theocratic rule have cost the Taliban international legitimacy and economic support.

Economically, Afghanistan continues to struggle with severe instability and fragile recovery. With over half its budget previously reliant on foreign aid, Afghanistan experienced a significant economic contraction of approximately 26% following the Taliban’s takeover in 2021. While there were modest signs of growth in 2024, with a reported GDP increase of 2.7%, this recovery remains fragile and has only recouped about 10% of the previous economic losses. The Afghan currency plummeted, unemployment soared, and businesses shut down due to banking restrictions. As of early 2025, an estimated 11.6 million people in Afghanistan, representing 25% of the total population, are experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity.

Security remains a major challenge. While the Taliban have consolidated power, ISIS-K continues to launch high-profile attacks against minorities, foreign interests, and Taliban officials. The increasing TTP as well as BLA and BRA attacks in Pakistan have further strained Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, raising concerns about cross-border militancy.

Regional security, trade, and economic prospects

Afghanistan’s instability affects regional security and economic potential. Terrorism spill-over remains a top concern, with terrorist outfits like ISIS-K, Al Qaeda, and TTP using Afghan territory to train militants. The refugee crisis is also mounting, straining Iran and Pakistan, both of which host millions of Afghan migrants.

Despite challenges, Afghanistan retains economic potential as a trade conduit. The Taliban have expressed a willingness to revive projects like the TAPI gas pipeline and trans-Afghan railways, which could enhance regional connectivity and trade between Central and South Asia.

Additionally, Central Asian countries have increasingly been engaging with Afghanistan on economic projects and transit agreements. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have continued investments in railway infrastructure, including extending railway links to connect Afghanistan with Central Asian transport corridors. Kazakhstan has expanded trade agreements, particularly in grain and fuel exports to Afghanistan.

However, security concerns hinder investment. While China and Pakistan engage in trade, large-scale foreign investment remains elusive due to political and security uncertainties.

The Taliban’s opium ban in April 2022 led to a reported 80% reduction in poppy cultivation, disrupting Afghanistan’s narcotics-driven economy. This move has worsened rural poverty, depriving many farmers of their primary income source.

Future scenarios

Stagnation under hard-line rule: The Taliban maintain control but refuse reforms, leading to continued isolation, economic hardship, and security challenges.

Incremental improvement and integration: The Taliban adopt limited reforms, potentially reopening girls’ schools or forming a broader government, leading to gradual international recognition and economic engagement.

Deterioration and conflict relapse: Economic desperation and extremist insurgencies could lead to renewed civil conflict, turning Afghanistan into a battleground for proxy warfare.

External strategic shifts: A geopolitical realignment – such as a US-Taliban security arrangement or a Russia-China-backed stabilisation effort – could reshape Afghanistan’s trajectory.

Conclusion: a not-so-great game

Unlike past eras of intense great power struggles, Afghanistan today is more of a challenge to be managed than a prize to be won. It requires careful management rather than conquest. While regional actors engage selectively, none are willing to bear the full burden of stabilising the country.

For the Afghan people, slogans of great games mean little – what matters is escaping the cycle of conflict and economic despair. If Afghanistan is to move forward, its future must shift from being a contested battleground to a cooperative regional effort. Otherwise, it will remain “not such a great game,” but rather a continuing tragedy on the world’s conscience.