It is premature to talk about the formation of two blocs in the “new Europe” based on their attitude towards the so-called “Russian threat”: rather, these are clubs of like-minded people, which can conditionally be called the Baltic and Danube. It cannot be ruled out that in the future European configuration, properly the countries of the “Danube Club” will be Russia’s main dialogue partners within the EU — just like “old Europe” was twenty years ago, writes Anton Bespalov, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
While observing the tumultuous electoral events in Moldova and Georgia towards the end of last year, it was impossible not to recall a significant anniversary. Two decades ago, the dispute over the counting of votes in the Ukrainian presidential election sparked the “Orange Revolution”, which now seems to have marked the beginning of the European Union’s endeavour to establish control over the post-Soviet Europe. In the autumn of 2024, similar statements were made regarding Russia’s attempts to maintain its sphere of influence, but this time, the focus was on other countries in a distinct historical context.
In May 2004, the first major wave of EU enlargement to the east took place. Just a few months later, the “new Europe” – the former socialist countries that joined the European Union – loudly declared their special position within the EU, actively supporting the “Orange Revolution.” The leading role was played by Poland, for which the separation of Ukraine from Russia is one of the strategic goals rooted in the geopolitical thinking tradition. The Baltic states, primarily Lithuania, expressed solidarity with it.
The term “old Europe”, first used in 2003 by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to describe the differences between old and new NATO members in the context of preparations for the invasion of Iraq, attracted a lot of criticism, but turned out to be quite appropriate. “Old Europe” developed close and mutually beneficial cooperation with Moscow in many areas, albeit not devoid of contradictions, and in 2004-2005 France and Germany demonstrated caution and a reluctance to antagonise Russia. The Europeans preferred not to think about the prospects of Ukraine joining the European Union, whose interests Warsaw had volunteered to represent. Ukraine was too far from the membership criteria and the impressions from the first wave of expansion were too fresh.
In the nine years that passed between the first “Maidan” and the second one, the EU policy underwent a serious transformation. In 2013-14, Brussels’ position was tougher and much more consolidated: there can be no alternatives to Ukraine pursuing association with the EU, as well as multilateral formats for discussing this course (especially with the participation of Russia). If in 2004-2005 the EU was impartial, albeit still a mediator, it had emerged as an active participant in the political confrontation in Ukraine, contributing to its radicalisation. Nevertheless, due to the special role of France and Germany in the EU, contact with Russia was preserved, as evidenced by the emergence of the “Normandy Format” to resolve the situation in Donbass (although they were not entirely convincing, and, as it turned out later, the Western partners were pursuing goals far from the declared ones).
In the following years, Moscow's special relations with Berlin and Paris rapidly deteriorated. From a policy of interaction with Russia, the “large” European countries tacitly switched to a course of containment. This was due to both security concerns in connection with the conflict in Donbass, and the growing crisis surrounding their domestic policies, which caused concern among traditional elites; particularly the strengthening of non-systemic forces, especially the far right. Suspicions that Russia could take advantage of this situation to interfere in domestic politics, especially against the backdrop of similar - and still unproven - accusations in the United States after the election of Donald Trump as president in 2016, played an important role in alienating “old Europe” from Russia.
European bureaucracy has declared the principle of “more Europe” to be the solution to almost all pressing problems, which means even deeper integration within the European Union as well as constant expansion outward. From the point of view of Eurocracy, the “European path” is the only development option for the former socialist countries and former Soviet republics that remain outside the European Union for now. In the EU itself, expansion has effectively ceased to be a subject of discussion: in some countries, there may be voices “against”, but the main course has been determined.
In autumn 2024, during the presidential elections and referendum on constitutional amendments in Moldova, the EU showed itself as a force that does not tolerate objections. The situation, in which the majority of citizens living in the country spoke out both against President Sandu and against joining the European Union, was explained to the European public as the result of “aggressive interference from Moscow”. It was presented as part of a broader confrontation between the West and Russia. The EU also sees Georgia as an arena for this confrontation, where the ruling Georgian Dream party, labelled “pro-Russian” in the West, won the parliamentary elections. The European Parliament took unprecedented measures, demanding a repeat of the parliamentary elections and the introduction of sanctions against its leaders. In response, Georgia suspended negotiations on joining the EU. “We are not going to join the European Union begging and standing on one leg, but we will join the European Union with dignity, with a proper democratic system and a strong economy,” Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said. Georgia, therefore, is not abandoning the "European path" at all. But in the eyes of the EU, attempts to join it on its own terms are tantamount to actions in favour of Russia. Today ousting Russia from the post-Soviet space is presented as the most important strategic goal, in line with the interests of Europeans. This easily reveals the foreign policy logic that guided Poland and like-minded countries of the “new Europe” twenty years ago. If in 2004 Warsaw waged a poorly concealed struggle against Moscow for influence in Ukraine, into which the EU was drawn only reluctantly, today containing Russia is one of the main goals of EU expansion.
However, something else is also noteworthy. The “new Europe” was united by the experience of transitioning from socialism to Western-style democracy and a market economy. From the EU’s point of view, the Visegrad Group countries achieved the greatest success. They (except Slovakia) were the first of the post-socialist countries to be granted NATO membership, which was perceived as the first step towards integration into Western institutions. However, the Eurosceptics came to power in these countries soon after they’d joined the EU, seeking to enjoy all the benefits of membership, but at the same time to advance their own agenda, which did not coincide with the general line of Brussels.
While these forces are largely like-minded on issues such as the primacy of national law over European law, migration, green energy, and their shared conservative values, they nevertheless diverge in their understanding of the geopolitical context. Here two different perspectives have emerged: Polish and Hungarian. While the confrontation with Russia is entirely consistent with Polish foreign policy philosophy, Hungary under Viktor Orbán has taken different positions, which in the current political atmosphere in the EU are sometimes characterised as “pro-Russian”.
This may seem counterintuitive, given that Orbán belongs to the same cohort of politicians as the leading figures of the Polish Law and Justice party. All of them fought fiercely against both the socialist regimes in their countries and the post-communist forces that, in their opinion, became the main beneficiaries of the transition to democracy in the late 1980s. In the case of the Polish elites, opposition to communism smoothly flowed into opposition to Russia, which is strikingly similar to the worldview of American elites, regardless of party affiliation.
Let us recall that Poland brought to the EU not only its anti-Russian agenda, but also its readiness to represent the interests of the United States in Europe. On the eve of its accession, Poland declared that it would become the closest US ally in the bloc after Great Britain , and Brexit made the clarification “after Great Britain” redundant. Today, the theme of the “struggle between democracies and autocracies”, which includes the confrontation with Russia, and the armed conflict in Ukraine in particular, fits completely into the logic of American-Chinese rivalry, and therefore Poland's position will remain in demand despite the arrival of the new administration in the United States.
As for Hungary under Orbán, it is guided by a pragmatic approach, not seeing any benefits in the confrontation with Russia either for itself or for Europe as a whole. Today, without much sympathy for Russia as such, Hungarians do not believe that the conflict in Ukraine can be resolved by forcing Moscow to capitulate. They are convinced that participating in futile attempts to achieve this will make their lives noticeably worse, at a minimum.
Both positions have supporters outside Poland and Hungary. The first is supported by the Baltic and Nordic countries, the second by neighbours in the Danube basin. It is premature to talk about the formation of two blocs in the “new Europe” based on attitudes regarding the “Russian threat”: rather, these are clubs of like-minded people, which can be conditionally called the Baltic and Danube clubs. Due to geography, the countries of the Baltic club occupy a central place in the plans of the US and NATO in containing Russia in Europe, but this is not the only issue. The political climate in these countries makes them active volunteers at the forefront of confrontation.
The Danube Club, which is in opposition to the EU's general line, currently consists of Hungary and Slovakia, but Croatia is joining it, Austria and the Czech Republic are gradually getting closer, and outside the EU, Serbia shares its views. Time will tell whether it is able to act as a united front and exert some influence on Brussels' policies. It cannot be ruled out that in the future European configuration, properly the countries of the Danube Club will be Russia's main dialogue partners within the EU - just like “old Europe” was twenty years ago.
Of course, this will be a different type of interaction. Russia's “special” relations with Berlin and Paris were a legacy of the era of great European powers and looked somewhat anachronistic twenty years ago. Germany and France have not renounced their “greatness”, but have delegated it to a pan-European project for which they continue to feel a special responsibility. In contrast, the countries of the Danube Club do not aspire to greatness, and therefore can afford themselves greater freedom of manoeuvre. In the event that the European Union does not choose the path of existential confrontation with Russia, but goes for a gradual restoration of ties with it, these countries can play the role of a mediator and a useful channel of communication.